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FEDERAL COURTS: ARTICLE I, II, III, AND IV
ADJUDICATION
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The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States
has gone almost unremarked in the academic literature. Instead, attention
focuses on Article III “constitutional” courts with occasional discussion of how
they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or “legislative”
courts. At best, these labels are misleading: all federal courts have a
constitutional locus. Most (but not all) are brought into being via legislation.
The binary approach ignores the full range of adjudicatory bodies, which find
root in different constitutional provisions: Article III, Section 1, Article I,
Section 8; Article IV, Section 3; Article II, Section 2/Article I, Section 8, Clause
3; and Article II, Section 1. These distinctions matter for defining jurisdiction
and understanding the scope of the authorities—and constitutional protections—
that apply. The failure of scholars to take into account the panoply contributes
to inaccurate analyses and cabins debates. This Article takes a significant step
forward, providing a conceptual framework for each type of court and
delineating, based on their legal and historical underpinning, which entities
constitute each category. It details the courts’ constitutive elements and their
jurisdiction as supported by doctrine, statutory law, and scholarly literature,
providing the first, comprehensive taxonomy of federal courts in the United
States.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout U.S. history, entities created under Article III, Section 1 have
been referred to as “constitutional courts.” What characterizes them is that they
“share in the exercise of the judicial power defined in [Article III, Section 2],
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can be invested with no other jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office
during good behavior, with no power in Congress to provide otherwise.”1 In
contrast, certain tribunals that do not meet the Article III requirements have been
labelled “Article I,” “legislative,” or “non-constitutional” courts.2 These
institutions are understood to be “created by Congress in the exertion of other
powers,” with their functions directed to specific ends and their judges holding
office according to conditions set by Congress.3 While they may have some
statutory protections, adjudicators in Article I tribunals are not constitutionally
protected from removal during periods of good behavior, nor is their
compensation guaranteed to remain undiminished during their tenure.4
The epithets employed to describe these two types of entities are deeply
misleading. “Constitutional” (i.e., Article III) courts are not the only federal
adjudicatory bodies constitutionally grounded: every federal court finds its locus
in the constitutional text. Nor are “legislative” (i.e., Article I) courts the only
tribunals brought into being by legislation. All inferior Article III courts are
created by Congress.5 Numerous other tribunals are rooted in Congress’s Article
I, Section 8 enumerated powers. Some courts established by Congress,
moreover, do not derive from Article I, Section 8 at all, instead finding their
locus in Article IV, Section 3. Yet other entities, such as courts of occupation,
have nothing to do with Congress but, under Article II, are constitutional federal
courts nonetheless.
This lack of precision has resulted in an inaccurate representation of what
entities comprise the federal judicial system. Casebooks and treatises largely
ignore dozens of federal courts in existence.6 Even Hart and Wechsler, a
canonical text, mentions just a handful of non-Article III entities and sidesteps
1. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
2. See e.g., ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43746,
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 11-12 (2014).
3. Id.; see also Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 563 (1933).
4. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 449; Williams, 289 U.S. at 561, 581.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL FINCH ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CONTEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS
(3d ed. 2020) (incorporating only one chapter on non-Article III courts); MICHAEL L. WELLS ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed. 2019) (focusing almost entirely on
Article III and the relationship between federal and state courts, with only cursory mention of
legislative courts and administrative tribunals and no discussion of territorial courts, consular
courts, military tribunals, or other non-Article III entities); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS:
THE CURRENT QUESTIONS (2017) (narrowly discussing Article III entities); CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT AND MARY KAY KANE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (7th ed. 2011) (addressing just
Article III courts and their relationship to state courts); JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION (2d ed. 2011) (discussing only Article III entities); ROBERT A. CARP ET
AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed. 2010) (making only cursory reference in the introductory
chapter to “legislative courts” as entities created under Article I and omitting any reference to
territorial courts, consular courts, or courts of occupation); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS,
at 100–02, 118–31 (3d ed. 2009) (having only one out of twelve chapters addressing “Non-Article
III Adjudicative Bodies” in which cursory reference is made to a few examples).
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any discussion of their constitutional underpinning.7 The lack of attention to the
constituent parts of the system stunts our understanding of constitutional law,
the history of the judiciary, the relationship among federal courts, and the
extent—and limits—of their jurisdiction. It contributes to vague and inaccurate
assertions.8 And it fuels the cumbrous and narrow debate about the legitimacy
of assigning matters within the cases and controversies requirements of Article
III to Article I entities.9 Scholars’ failure to consider the full range of federal
courts has led to inaccurate characterizations of what constitutes federal judicial
power. While some entities may have recourse to Article III entities as an
appellate matter (and thus carry “the judicial power of the United States”), not
all of them do—nor need they, as a constitutional matter, in order to exercise
judicial power.

7. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 36–39 (7th ed. 2018) (very briefly mentioning Courts of the District of
Columbia, territorial courts, the tax court, the court of federal claims, the court of veterans appeals,
and military tribunals).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed. 2010) (collapsing
administrative tribunals and Article I(8) courts into the same category by suggesting that
“legislative courts” often have “administrative and quasilegislative as well as judicial duties” and
briefly mentioning in the same discussion the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as a
specialized court created by Congress without acknowledging it as an Article III entity); William
Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1522, 1549, 1558 (2020)
(overlooking consular courts and courts of occupation, both of which exercise Article II power
despite due process implications; referring to “so-called military courts” as “not really courts in the
constitutional sense;” and asserting “[b]ankruptcy courts, military courts, the U.S. Tax Court, and
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims are not courts, in the constitutional sense.”); David J. Bederman,
Article II Courts, 44 MERCER L. REV. 825, 833–34 (1993) (overlooking the role of Article II in the
formation of consular courts).
9. For further discussion of the debate see, e.g., Baude, supra note 8 (distinguishing among
certain courts as exercising either the judicial or the executive power); James E. Pfander, Article I
Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643
(2004) (arguing for an inferior tribunal reading of Art. I(8)(9) to support the existence of both
Article III and I entities); Craig A. Stern, What’s a Constitution Among Friends?—Unbalancing
Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1073–74 (1998) (distinguishing between judicial and executive
power to explain the Article III/Article I divide); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the
Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 887–92 (1990) (challenging the legitimacy of
territorial courts and referring to Marshall’s decision in Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton
(Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) as “fatuous”); Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as
Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L. J. 233, 235–36
(1990) (arguing the existence of non-Article III courts as a matter of history and expediency, not
constitutional fidelity); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 916 (1988) (embracing the appellate review theory); Martin H.
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L. J. 197 (presenting criteria for Article III versus administrative agency adjudication); David
P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 719 (1982) (critiquing Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Canter as
to the legitimacy of a territorial court as “difficult to reconcile with the purposes of [A]rticle III”
while sidestepping the potential locus of Congressional authority as Article IV).
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This Article, accordingly, provides the first comprehensive account of the
federal judicial system, which includes general and specialized Article III,
Section 1 courts; specialized Article I, Section 8 enumerated powers courts;
Article IV, Section 3 territorial courts; Article II, Section 2/Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 treaty-based courts; and Article II, Section 1 courts of occupation.
Figure 1, below, provides the overall taxonomy for the Article, which defines
and distinguishes each court from each other and from administrative tribunals,
providing in the process a robust account of the scope of the judiciary and
demonstrating that the system is far more complex than the simple binary
approach that has hitherto marked scholarly discussion. In so doing, it
challenges existing theoretical constructs that mark the field.
Part II begins by detailing the eight Article III, Section 1 courts that currently
operate, five of which have specialized subject matter jurisdiction.10 It
recognizes numerous specialized Article III courts that are no longer in existence
and acknowledges that all Article III, Section 1 courts have inherent powers that
stem from their duty to ensure fairness and justice in the course of adjudication,
their ability to efficiently manage their resources, and their interest in protecting
the integrity, independence, and reputation of the courts as an institution.11
These powers do not depend on any statute. They arise from the courts qua
Article III entities. Separation of powers demands that the exercise of authorities
that go to the core of the court acting in its judicial capacity are beyond the reach
of either Congress or the Executive Branch.

10. The five include the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review, the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, and the U.S. Court of International Trade.
11. For scholarly discussion of essential inherent powers, see Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural
Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of the
Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001); Sara Sun Beale,
Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984). To the extent that scholars
disagree, it is in how broadly such powers should be understood. Some say any action bearing a
natural relation to the administration of justice falls exclusively within the purview of the courts.
See, e.g., Joseph J. Anclien, Broader Is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Court, 64 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 53 (2008); Linda Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice
Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1320–22 (1993).
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Fig. 1
In Part III, we turn to specialized courts established under Congress’s Article
I, Section 8 enumerated powers. While much has been made of the relationship
between Article I, Sections 8 and 9, granting Congress the power to create
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and Article III entities, almost no
attention has been paid to the relationship of Article I, Sections 8 and 9 to the
other elements of Article I, Section 8 which provide further constitutional
grounding. Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 provides a locus for Courts of the
District of Columbia (the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals).12 In the
military sphere, nine tribunals find their homes in Articles I, Sections 8, 10, 11,
14, and 16. They divide into three categories: the courts-martial system
regulates servicemembers;13 military commissions apply to civilians and enemy
combatants;14 and veterans courts adjudicate decisions regarding

12. The constitutional nexus for the Courts is considered to be U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
But note that the District of Columbia courts’ statuses have alternated over history. See discussion
infra Part III.A.
13. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987) (holding that trying a member of the Armed Forces under the
UCMJ does not require the offense charged to have a service connection).
14. See In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Khadr v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 3d
1314, 1316 (C.M.C.R. 2014).

Summer 2022]

Federal Courts

549

servicemembers’ benefits.15 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims and U.S. Tax
Court both derive from Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, with the U.S. Bankruptcy
Courts and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels as well as the (now defunct) citizenship
courts from Article I, Section 8, Clause 4.16 Because Article III powers do not
extend to Article I tribunals, litigants in the latter have access as of right to an
Article III appellate court.17
Article I is not the only source of Congressional power to constitute judicial
entities. Part IV, accordingly, turns to Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, which
provides for Congress “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”18 This
clause provides independent authority for adjudication of disputes outside of
Article III—a power that has been conspicuously overlooked in the effort to
shoehorn federal courts into the “Article III or Article I” nomenclature. Two
categories mark this area: the first, incorporated territorial courts, operated in
nearly every state (outside of the original thirteen colonies), prior to admission
to the union; the second relates to unincorporated land, in which Congress has
established a number of parallel courts. The three currently in existence feed
into Article III, Section 1.
Part V turns to treaty-based courts, which derive from Article II, Section 2
coupled with Congress’s commerce authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause
3. Unlike territorial courts, in regard to which Congress acts as the first mover,
courts in this category depend on the Executive to negotiate international
agreements, subsequent to which Congress acts first to ratify the treaty and then
to implement its requirements. Consular courts come within this category, as do
other entities established by Congress consistent with diplomatic agreements,
which are not housed in the country with whom the agreement was reached.
With a couple of exceptions (i.e., the U.S. Court of China and the Court of
Private Land Claims, which dealt with title to lands transferred to the United
States following the Mexican-American War), treaty-based courts have been
insulated from Article III, Section 1 adjudication.
Part VI examines Article II courts of occupation and expansion, which the
President establishes in the context of war in occupied territories. Far from being
a relic of the past, at least four such courts operated in the twentieth century.
None is supported by legislation. Instead, they rely wholly on the President’s
Article II, Section 1 powers. In some cases, these tribunals have acted as a
forerunner to territorial courts established by Congress under Article IV, Section
3, Clause 2. They divide into three categories: courts established in land
acquired by the United States, courts established in response to armed rebellion,
and courts created in the context of war.
15. History, U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/
history.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 4.
17. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494–95 (2011).
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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In Part VII, we briefly address administrative tribunals, which depart from
specialized Article I, Section 8 courts by the degree of independence they have
from the Executive. Numerous such entities provide appeals of executive
agency decisions or themselves constitute independent, quasi-judicial agencies.
Some examples include: the U.S. Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration
Appeals, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the U.S. International Trade
Commission, the Social Security Administration’s Appeal Council, the Federal
Trade Commission, the Federal Election Commission, and the National Labor
Relations Board.
The final section, Part VIII, underscores that the federal judicial structure is
far more complex than is generally acknowledged. Accounts that narrowly
focus on the interplay between Article III and Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 miss
the independent power of Congress to establish adjudicatory bodies pursuant to
its other authorities. Similarly absent are considerations about other
constitutional authorities that give rise to different types of courts. Trying to
justify the difference by according judicial power to territories as a separate
government may seem attractive, but it fails to account for the impact on
citizens’ rights. No more so does it explain treaty-based or consular courts, or
even courts of occupation. What does account for these entities is the fact that
they are rooted in different constitutional powers and part of an intricate system
of adjudication.
I. THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 COURTS
Article III, Section 1 provides for the judicial power to be vested in the
Supreme Court “and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”19 Under this power, the legislature has established
both non-specialized and specialized Article III courts.20 Their status conveys
certain inherent authorities that are constitutionally derived and indelibly linked
to the courts’ status as a co-equal branch of government. The fact that some of
these courts are geographically limited, or established with particular subjectmatter in mind, does nothing to divest them of their Article III authority as the
judicial power of the United States.
Once created, Article III courts “share in the exercise of judicial power
defined in [Article III].”21 All Article III judges are guaranteed life tenure,
removal only for good cause, and undiminished compensation.22 Unlike most
state courts, all Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.23 They have
authority over nine categories of cases and controversies, which divide into two

19. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
20. See, e.g., the United States Court of Appeals and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, respectively.
21. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929).
22. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
23. See Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799).
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general categories: the nature of the cause and the character of the parties.24 The
“judicial power” exercised in relation to them is “the power of a court to decide
and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties
who bring a case before it for decision.”25 Cabined by the constitutional tenets,
the meaning assigned to “cases” and “controversies” therefore at once
establishes federal jurisdiction and, along with the contours set by statute,
determines the extent of the judicial power. The Supreme Court has, at times,
read the clause broadly to encompass cases that turn on a “federal ingredient.”26
A. Non-Specialized Geographic Courts
Non-specialized Article III courts are the courts one generally thinks of when
contemplating the “federal judiciary”: namely, the Supreme Court, Circuit
Courts of Appeals, the District Courts, and the (now defunct) Circuit Courts.27
Although all federal courts have some level of specialization of subject matter,
Congress granted these courts (save the Supreme Court) with jurisdiction based
on geographic location.28
The Supreme Court, subject to the case-or-controversy requirement, exercises
absolute authority over the U.S. Constitution, treaties, and federal statutory
law.29 It understands this requirement to mean that Article III courts may not
issue advisory opinions and the matter in question must satisfy standing and
ripeness, not be moot, and not present a “political question.”30 The Court also
exercises jurisdiction over matters involving federal common law, with due
24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
25. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
26. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824). Note, however, that
to the extent that Osborn is good law, it is because it is considered an expression of protective
jurisdiction—i.e., a reading of “arising under” to protect vital federal interest. See Verlinden B.V.
v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492–93 (1983). After Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley,
however, the “ingredient” argument has taken a back seat and the Court has in general taken a more
restrained view of what constitutes a claim “arising under” federal law. See Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1908).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 73, 73–75;
Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826.
28. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11–12, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78–80 (district and
circuit courts); Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828. While it is recognized that
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has a different docket load than other regional
circuits, we have included it within the non-specialized sets of courts. See, e.g., Eric M. Fraser et
al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013) (discussing
the Court’s unique workload resulting from the Court’s location, its geographic coverage compared
to other regional circuits, and Congress’s penchant for giving the Court exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in many different types of cases).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
30. See Letter to President George Washington from Supreme Court Justices (Aug. 8, 1793),
reprinted in FOUNDERS ONLINE, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Washington/05-13-02-0263 (establishing no advisory opinions); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (establishing political-question doctrine); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
96–97 (1968) (acknowledging the Article III “prohibition against advisory opinions”).
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deference to comity and respect for state authorities.31 Congress has assigned
the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
between two or more states and original (but not exclusive) jurisdiction of all
actions in which ambassadors or public officials of foreign states are party, all
controversies between the states and the federal government, and all actions by
a state against citizens of another state or aliens.32 The Court has the authority
to review (by certiorari) all cases in the Courts of Appeal as well as all federal
questions decided via state courts of last resort.33 It has jurisdiction over
decisions from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,34 the Supreme Court
of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,35 and the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands,36 as well as the specialized Article III courts and certain decisions of the
[Article I, Section 8] U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.37 Although
originally established with one chief justice and five associate justices appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, under the Judiciary
Act of 1869, the Court expanded to include its current number of one chief
justice and eight associate justices.38
The Courts of Appeal and District Courts serve as inferior, non-specialized
and geographically-limited courts.39 The former is constituted by 179 judges
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.40 Like
those on the Supreme Court, they have life tenure and salary protection.41
Congress has created twelve such regional circuits,42 which encapsulate ninetyone district courts.43 The 663 judges appointed to the District Courts have the
same constitutional protections extended to the Supreme Court and the Courts
of Appeal.44

31. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1874) (refraining
from reviewing state common law not as a matter of Constitutional jurisdiction but out of comity).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1251.
33. Id. §§ 1254, 1257(a).
34. Id. § 1257(b).
35. Id. § 1258.
36. Id. § 1260.
37. Id. § 1259.
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73; Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16
Stat. 44, 44.
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43, 81–132; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 73, 73–74; Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826; District of
Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 475.
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 44. Note that there are only 167 judges excluding the specialized Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
42. See id.
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 133. The district courts in Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Virgin Islands are not included in § 133 as they are courts established under Article IV of the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 133.
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Two primary statutes establish subject matter jurisdiction for the District
Courts, granting them original jurisdiction over federal questions (i.e., “all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”) as
well as disputes between and among citizens of different states (i.e., diversity
jurisdiction).45 Several provisions detail jurisdiction of constitutionallyenumerated federal questions,46 provide additional bases for the suit authorized
under Article III.47 Congress restricted the ability of Article III courts to act on
certain matters until they have first worked their way through the state judicial
domain.48
The (now defunct) Circuit Courts (1789–1912) were Article III courts that ran
in tandem with district courts. Created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Circuit
Courts served as trial courts and had appellate jurisdiction.49 In 1891, the Court
of Appeals was established as an appellate court for district courts and circuit
courts.50
B. Specialized Courts
Congress’s authority to create lower courts and to set their subject-matter
jurisdiction “necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of those
Courts to particular objects.”51 As with non-specialized and geographicallyfocused Article III courts, those with specialized subject-matter jurisdiction
carry the judicial power of the United States. The requirements of unity,
supremacy, and inferiority having been met, the judicial protections of good
behavior and set compensation respected, and the case or controversy
requirement satisfied, such entities carry the full power of the third branch of
government. Scholars and the Courts agree that it is “uncontroversial that the
lower courts described in Article III, and created by Congress pursuant to Article
I, § 8, exercise the judicial power of the United States described in Article III, §
2.”52 Accordingly, interference by the other branches in the core functioning of
Article III courts, of any type, violates separation of powers. There are currently

45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32.
46. See id. §§ 1330–69.
47. See id. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). A district court having original jurisdiction
over a civil action shall have “jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related” to the action as
to “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III.” Id. § 1367(a).
48. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (taxes by states); id. § 1342 (rate orders of state agencies).
49. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79.
50. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The circuit courts were abolished by the
Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
51. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
52. David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government
Misconduct, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (2005); see Turner v. President, Directors, & Co.
of Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799); United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).
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six federal Article III specialized courts. At least seven additional specialized
courts have at one point been brought into existence by Congress.53
1. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review
Two of the most prominent specialized Article III courts in existence are the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR). Congress created them in 1978 to act
as a neutral, third party arbiter in approving the collection of domestic electronic
surveillance undertaken for foreign intelligence purposes.54 Their establishment
responded to public outcry at the extent to which the intelligence community
had placed U.S. citizens under surveillance, as well as the Supreme Court’s
determination that the executive could not engage in electronic surveillance for
domestic security purposes without some judicial process.55 Despite its in
camera, ex parte emphasis and the absence of adversary parties, from the
beginning, Congress has consistently considered FISC/FISCR to be an Article
III court.56 Every court to confront the question has agreed.57
53. The U.S. Customs Court, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Emergency Court of
Appeals, Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, the Commerce Court, the Special Railroad
Court, and the Court of Claims. Act of July 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-703, 70 Stat. 532; Act of
Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 1, 72 Stat. 848, 848; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
ch. 26, §1(a), 56 Stat. 23, 32; Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92210, sec. 2, § 211(b), 85 Stat. 743, 748–49; Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539;
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974); Act of July
28, 1953, ch. 253, sec. 1, § 171, 67 Stat. 226, 226.
54. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et. seq.).
55. See id. § 103(a), 92 Stat. at 1788; Intelligence Activities: Senate Resolution 21: Hearings
Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intel. Activities of
the U.S., 94th Cong., vol. 5, at 1 (1975); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972).
The law provides special protections for United States persons. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(2), (4),
1802(a)(1)(B), 1821(4)(D), 1822(a)(1)(A)(ii).
56. Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of
the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., 95th Cong. 26 (1978) (Letter from John M. Harmon,
Assistant Att’y Gen., to Rep. Edward P. Boland (Apr. 18, 1978), stating FISC/FISCR “will be
Article III courts”); id. at 116 (FISC, comprised of “article III judge[s]” is to be independent “and
in no way dependent on the executive branch of Government”); id. at 184 (Letter from Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy to the Rep. Robert McClory (Feb. 10, 1978), stating that FISC is considered within
“the constitutional jurisdiction of Article III courts.”); see also id. at 213–16, 224 (discussions
relating to whether the issues before the court would meet Article III requirements as cases or
controversies). It continues to do so. See 154 CONG. REC. 804 (2008) (statement of Sen. Russell
D. Feingold, alluding to FISC as an Article III court with “inherent power” over its own records
and balking at the idea that the administration could “withhold FISA Court opinions and documents
that include significant interpretations of law”); see also id. at 809 (statement of Sen. Sheldon
Whitehouse); ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43746,
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CREATE FEDERAL COURTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 6 (2014).
57. See, e.g., In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Ct. of Rev., No. FISCR
18-01, GID.CA.00006, 2018 WL 2709456, at *4 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018) (per curiam); In
re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., GID.C.00021, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486 & n.4 (FISA Ct. 2007);
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The role of the court has altered over time. Initially comprised of seven judges
selected by the Chief Justice from seven of the United States judicial circuits,58
FISC’s job was to ascertain whether the government had met its burden of
establishing probable cause that the target was a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, and likely to use the facility to be placed under surveillance, prior
to issuing orders.59 FISCR, comprised of three judges designated by the Chief
Justice from the United States district courts or courts of appeal, was fashioned
to serve in an appellate fashion.60 In cases in which FISCR denies an
application, the Government could file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.61 In 1994, Congress extended FISC’s authority to include ex
parte orders for physical search.62 In 1998, it incorporated mechanisms for pen
register/trap and trace (PR/TT), as well as acquiring business records.63 These
laws are colloquially referred to as “Traditional FISA.”64 Under them, FISC
initially functioned as a warrant-granting body, issuing more than 14,000 orders
and just one opinion between 1978 and 2001.65 Applications were sealed, and
procedures conducted in camera and ex parte.66
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act made numerous changes to FISA.67
Although it retained the size of FISCR at three judges, it expanded the number
of FISC judges to eleven, of whom at least three must reside within twenty miles
of the District of Columbia.68 Congress expanded the business records provision
to give the Court jurisdiction over orders to require “the production of any
In re Sealed Case, GID.CA.00001, 310 F.3d 717, 731, 732 n.19 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam);
United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791–92 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002,
1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 103(a), 92 Stat.
1783, 1788.
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A); 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
60. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
61. Id. An electronic communication service provider receiving a directive under Title VII
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act may similarly seek certiorari in the Supreme Court.
Id. § 1881a(i)(6)(B).
62. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, § 302(c), 108
Stat. 3423, 3445 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1822(c)).
63. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601–02,
112 Stat. 2396, 2404–12 (1998) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846, 1861–1864).
64. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 757, 794 (2014).
65. See FISA Annual Reports to Congress, 1979-2002, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ (May 13, 2021); In re Application of
the U.S. for an Ord. Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises & Pers. Prop.,
GID.C.00001 (FISC Ct. June 11, 1981, reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280, at 16–19 (1981).
66. In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487–88, 488 n.12 (FISA Ct.
2007).
67. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206–208, 214–
215, 218, 504, 1003, 115 Stat. 272, 282–83, 286–88, 291, 364–65, 392.
68. Id. § 208, 115 Stat. at 283.
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tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
items).”69 Whereas before records could be sought only from common carriers,
public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities,
records now can be sought from any business or entity.70 In 2005, when section
215 was set to expire, Congress added language requiring that the government
establish “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are
relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment)” prior to
FISC granting an order.71
In 2008, Congress further expanded the courts’ responsibilities, giving
FISC/FISCR oversight over the domestic collection of the communications of
non-U.S. persons, as well as U.S. persons, believed to be overseas.72 These
changes, which entailed oversight of acquisition, minimization, retention, and
use of the information obtained, heralded a significant shift in the court’s role:
so-called “Modernized FISA” ushered in an era of bulk and programmatic
collection of citizens’ and non-U.S. persons’ data.73 In light of new
technologies, the government sought novel statutory and doctrinal
interpretations, forcing the FISC/FISCR to consider constitutional and statutory
limits and whether government action comported with the law.74

69. Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287.
70. Compare id., with Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411 (1998).
71. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §
106, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
72. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, sec. 101, §§ 702–704, 122 Stat.
2436, 2438–57.
73. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the
Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 125–
28 (2015); Laura K. Donohue, The Case for Reforming Section 702 of U.S. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Law, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 26, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/report/casereforming-section-702-us-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-law.
74. As Presiding Judge John Bates explained on one such occasion, “[t]he current application
relies on [the] prior framework, but also seeks to expand authorization in ways that test the limits
of what the applicable FISA provisions will bear.” Judgment of Nov. 3, 2011, GID.C.00092, 4
(FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) [hereinafter Bates Mem. Op.]; see also Judgment of Nov. 18, 2013,
GID.C.00091, 1–2 (FISA Ct.) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“This application seeks authority for a much
broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and trace applications.”); Judgment of May
31, 2007, GID.C.00016, 12 & n.5 (FISA Ct.) (Vinson, J.) (arguing for collection not just to or from
but also about a selector); Judgment of Apr. 3, 2007, GID.C.00012, 16 (FISA Ct.) (Vinson, J.)
(arguing an expanded understanding of “facility” and stating that the NSA makes the probable
cause finding for selectors); Judgment of July 9, 2009, GID.C.00038, 5 (FISA Ct.) (Walton, J.)
(seeking bulk production of Internet metadata using PR/TT); EFF v. DOJ, GID.C.00136, 3–4 (FISA
Ct.) (Bates, J.) (“Under the expansive interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions put forward
by the government, the limitations may not have been warranted. But after careful consideration,
the Court adopted a less expansive interpretation of the statute.”).
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Beset by difficult questions, the courts’ roles have altered.75 Instead of just
issuing orders, the FISC/FISCR now routinely rule on critically-important First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendment questions.76 Their decisions impact separation of
powers, common law, and the rule of law. The Court examines complex matters
of statutory construction.77 And it monitors how the government wields its
power.78 FISC/FISCR opinions reveal the extent to which government actions
comport with—or violate—court directions and the law.79
An important and robust body of law is now emerging from a court that, for
decades, has been largely shielded from public inspection.80 Nearly 100
declassified FISC/FISCR opinions and 300 orders are now in the public domain,

75. See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206, 208, 214–215, 218, 504, 1003,
115 Stat. at 282, 283, 286–88, 291, 364–65, 392; USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006); Protect
America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436; see also In re Directives to Yahoo!, Inc. Pursuant to Section 105B of
the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. 105B(g): 07-01, GID.C.00025, at 3 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25,
2008) (Walton, J.) (noting “the [Protect America Act of 2007] . . . is hardly a model of legislative
clarity or precision.”); In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13,
GID.C.00033, 2–3 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008) (Walton, J.) (addressing tension between 50 U.S.C. §
1861 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703).
76. See, e.g., In re Proc. Required by Section 702(i) of the FISA Amends. Act of 2008, No.
Misc 08-01, GID.C.00028, 2008 WL 9487946 (FISA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.)
(addressing both First and Fourth Amendment issues); Opinion on Motion for Disclosure of Prior
Decisions, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00112 (FISA Ct. 2014) (Collyer, J.) (Fifth
Amendment); In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from
[REDACTED], No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00086 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (McLaughlin, J.) (First
and Fourth Amendments); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. 2002)
(addressing a Fourth Amendment issue).
77. See, e.g., In re Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033 (FISA Ct. 2008)
(Walton, J.).
78. EFF v. DOJ, 16-CV-02041, GID.C.00050, 10-11 (FISA Ct. 2009) (Hogan, J.).
79. See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord.
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things [REDACTED], No. BR 09-15, GID.C.00048, at 3–4 (FISA
Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) (Walton, J.) (NSA sent query results to email list of 189 analysts, “only 53 of
whom had received the required training”); Judgement of Oct. 3, 2011, GID.C.00073, at 15–18,
78–80 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) (NSA misled Court, violating FISA and the Fourth Amendment); Bates
Mem Op, GID.C.00092, at 3, 18, 100–105 (“NSA exceeded the scope of authorized acquisition
continuously during the more than [REDACTED] years of acquisition”; FBI, CIA, and NCTC
“accessed unminimized U.S. person information”; NSA disseminated “reports containing U.S.
person information”; government requested permission to violate law); Judgement of Sept. 25,
2012, GID.C.00078, at 26–27 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) (NSA misrepresented upstream collection,
acquiring U.S. person domestic communications).
80. More than two decades after its 1981 opinion, the Court issued two opinions. See, In re
All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, GID.C.00002 (FISA
Ct. 2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001. It published two more
opinions between 2007 and 2008. See, In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B
of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, GID.CA.00002 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008); In re
Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, GID.C.00021 (FISA Ct. 2007).
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as are hundreds of FISC/FISCR filings.81 Non-specialized Article III courts,
moreover, are increasingly having to grapple with FISA and to integrate FISC
jurisprudence into their decisions.
2. Alien Terrorist Removal Court
In 1987, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated what would
become a twenty-year effort to deport seven Palestinian men and a Kenyan
woman suspected of being members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, a radical wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization.82 The L.A.
Eight became emblematic of the difficulties entailed in using classified evidence
in deportation cases.83 In response, the Reagan Administration proposed the
creation of a special court to handle classified evidence and the removal of
aliens.84 Similar to the FISC/FISCR, the new court would be comprised of
sitting U.S. District Court judges selected by the Chief Justice.85 It was not until
the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
however, and passage of the 1996 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, that Congress created the specialized Article III court.86 Later in the year,
81. See FISC/FISCR Opinions, Foreign Intelligence Law Collection, DIGITAL GEO.,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052699 (last visited Mar. 28, 2022);
FISC/FISCR Orders, Foreign Intelligence Law Collection, DIGITAL GEO., https://repository.
library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052814 (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
82. Henry Weinstein, Final Two L.A. Defendants Cleared, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2007, 12:00
AM PT), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-nov-01-me-palestinian1-story.html.
83. Id. The immigrants in that case had been distributing Al Hadaf, the Popular Front’s
magazine, which was also available in public libraries and the U.S. Library of Congress. Id. The
initial charge came from the McCarthy-era McCarran-Walter Act —which had not been used since
the 1950s—six of the non-U.S. residents quickly had the charges dropped against them, with
technical visa violations alleged in their place. David Cole & Phyllis Bennis, Ten Years of the Los
Angeles Eight Deportation Case: Interview with David Cole, 202 MIDDLE E. REP., 41, 41 (1996);
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163. The two permanent
U.S. residents were then charged with associating with an organization advocating the destruction
of property. David Cole & Phyllis Bennis, Ten Years of the Los Angeles Eight Deportation Case:
Interview with David Cole, 202 MIDDLE E. REP., 41, 41 (1996).
84. Steven R. Valentine, Flaws Undermine Use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 17 LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER
1,
1–2
(Wash.
Legal
Found.
2002),
https://s3.us-east2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-uploads/upload/022202LBValentine.pdf (the author served from
1988 to 1993 in the Reagan and Bush Administrations as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Office of Immigration Litigation in the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division).
85. Id.
86. Congress refused to hold hearings. Id. Following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
Senator Robert Smith (R–N.H.) proposed an amendment to the 1994 crime bill to establish the
terrorist removal court. Although a voice vote carried it, during the Senate Conference, the
provision was dropped. Id. The following year, Smith re-introduced it as a standalone bill. See
Alien Terrorist Removal Act of 1995, S. 270, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Joe Biden (D–Del.), on
behalf of the Clinton Administration, similarly introduced the Omnibus Counterterrorism bill, a
bipartisan bill. Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, S. 390, 104th Cong. (1995). See also
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, sec. 401, §§ 501–
507, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258–68 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537) (2018).
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further revisions allowed for removal proceedings to proceed even where the
court deemed the proposed unclassified summary inadequate.87
The Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC) consists of five district court
judges appointed by the Chief Justice from five of the U.S. judicial circuits.88
Currently, three of the five federal judges currently on the court are also
members of the FISC.89 The judges serve five-year terms, are eligible for redesignation and may be jointly appointed to the FISC/FISCR.90 The court’s
decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and eligible for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.91 The
Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General must certify the application with
a statement of the facts and circumstances relied on by the DOJ to establish
probable cause that an alien is an “alien terrorist”—as described in 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(4)(B))—and physically present in the United States, and removal under
the regular immigration provisions would pose a risk to national security.92
Where these conditions are met, the judge is required to issue an order granting
the application.93 Denial must be accompanied by a written statement of the
reasons.94
Although the measures have been in place for nearly a quarter of a century,
the Attorney General has never applied to the ATRC to remove an alien terrorist,
with the result that the court has never conducted a proceeding.95 One theory as
to why this is the case highlights built-in procedural flaws: namely, that there is
no other “recourse to remove [lawful permanent residents] against whom the
sole evidence of their terrorist identity is FISA-obtained or derived from foreign
intelligence information or that is not appropriate for declassification or public
acknowledgment.”96 While the statute authorizes the use of FISA-derived
information in the proceedings, where the court does not approve of the
government’s proposed unclassified summary of key evidence, the court has to
find two conditions:
87. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 354, 110 Stat.
3009, 3009–641 to 3009–644 (1996).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a).
89. See Alien Terrorist Removal Courts: Judges¸ FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-judges (last visited Dec. 31, 2020); Current
Membership – Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, U.S. FOREIGN INTEL. SURVEILLANCE CT.,
https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-membership (last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1532(a)–(b).
91. Id. § 1535.
92. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D).
93. Id. § 1533(c)(2).
94. Id. § 1533(c)(3).
95. Alien Terrorist Removal Court, 1996-Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/courts/alien-terrorist-removal-court-1996-present (last visited Oct. 18, 2020) (current as of
2018).
96. Aram A. Gavoor & Timothy M. Belsan, The Forgotten FISA Court: Exploring the
Inactivity of the ATRC, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 139, 141–42 (2020).
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(I) [T]he continued presence of the alien in the United States would
likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or
death or serious bodily injury to any person, and
(II) the provision of the summary would likely cause serious and
irreparable harm to the national security or death or serious bodily
injury to any person.97
Because the court must make both findings, the government is left in the “same
type of ‘Catch-22’ dilemma that justified the ATRC’s creation” in the first place:
i.e., “disclosing and risking sources and methods . . . versus the removal of alien
terrorists.”98
3. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Historically, federal district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over cases
related to federal patent law and copyrights.99 In the late 1970s and early 1980s
though, corporations, government attorneys, and academics convinced Congress
that creating a single appellate court for patent cases would help to create
consistency and to relieve the pressure on district courts for cases involving
complex litigation and detailed technical expertise.100 In 1982, Congress
responded by creating the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,101
merging the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate
division of the U.S. Court of Claims.102 It consists of twelve judges appointed
by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate.103
The Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases in which the district
court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338. This includes: (a) civil
actions related to patents or plant variety protection; (b) certain appeals of claims
against the United States (c) appeals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; (d)
appeals from decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or the U.S.
Court of International Trade; and (e) review of certain agency decisions and
appeals linked to particular statutory authorities, for example, § 211 of the 1970
Economic Stabilization Act, § 5 of the 1973 Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act, and § 506(c) of the Natural Gas Policy Act.104 The court also has

97. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
98. Gavoor & Belsan, supra note 96, at 142.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1338.
100. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 6–7 (1989).
101. The Court of Claims, one of the precursors to the Federal Circuit, is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 148–154. Further related history can be found infra Part II.C. discussing the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
102. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 44.
104. Id. § 1295. The court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the inhabited territorial
courts such as Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the North Mariana Islands, except for matters related
to the subjects listed. Id.
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jurisdiction over interlocutory decisions.105 Accordingly, one scholar has
proposed that the D.C. and Federal Circuits are more properly considered “semispecialized,” as significant portions of their dockets deal with issues outside
narrow categories such as administrative and patent law.106
The court operates under a modified version of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, referred to as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Rules
of Practice.107 Although initially the Supreme Court allowed the Federal Circuit
court to operate fairly freely, in recent years it has begun to take a stronger stand,
reversing a number of the court’s decisions on substantive grounds.108 In 2017,
for instance, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in seven cases, six of which it
reversed in whole or part.109
4. U.S. Court of International Trade
The U.S. Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over any civil
actions arising under certain sections of the 1930 Tariff Act, 1974 Trade Act,
and the 1979 Trade Agreements Act; rulings issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury related to certain decisions impacting trade; any law providing for
revenue from imports or tonnage, tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on imports;
and restrictions on imports.110 Congress created it in 1980 to reorganize the
predecessor Customs Court. It consists of nine judges (not more than five of
whom can be from the same political party—a requirement that raises
constitutional concerns), appointed by the President by and with the advice and

105. Id. § 1292.
106. John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two
Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 553–55 (2010).
107. FED. CIR. R. (July 1, 2020), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-ofpractice/FederalCircuitRulesofPractice-July2020.pdf.
108. See, e.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 322 (2015) (reversing
the circuit’s practice of considering findings of fact de novo); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (rejecting a Federal Circuit application of a “general rule” unique to
patent disputes instead of using the traditional four-factor test for granting a permanent injunction).
109. See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017) (consolidating Nos. 15-1039, 151195) (focused on requirements under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
to provide sponsor with a copy of the biologics license application and the sponsor’s recourse for
failure to provide that information); Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523
(2017) (patent exhaustion due to conditional and authorized sales); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744
(2017), aff’g In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (constitutionality of disparaging
marks provision of the Lanham Act); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017)
(infringement liability for worldwide sales under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) for supplying a single
commodity component); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137
S. Ct. 954 (2017) (availability of laches in patent infringement actions); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft
Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (patent venue).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1581. It also has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions related to import
commenced by the United States, related counter-, cross-, and third-party claims, and civil actions
under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) or the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement. Id. §§ 1582–1584.
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consent of the Senate.111 The court, which is located in New York, possesses
“all the powers in law and equity of, or as conferred by statute upon, a district
court of the United States.”112
5. Specialized Courts No Longer in Existence
At least seven specialized Article III courts created by Congress no longer
exist. The first, the United States Customs Court, appears to have been an
Article III court based on the statute designating it as such in 1956.113 In 1980,
the Customs Court was replaced by the U.S. Court of International Trade.114
From 1909 to 1929, appeals from the Customs Court (and its predecessor
Board of U.S. General Appraisers) were made to the Court of Customs Appeals,
an Article I tribunal.115 In 1929, Congress expanded jurisdiction to include
patent and trademark and changed the court’s name to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.116 Twenty-nine years later, Congress formally designated the
court as established under Article III.117 In 1982, this court’s functions were
subsumed by the then newly created U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.118
During World War II, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 to stabilize prices and prevent profiteering.119 It created the Emergency
Court of Appeals, comprised of three or more district or circuit judges selected
by the Chief Justice, with exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to regulations
issued by the Office of Price Administration.120 The statute empowered the chief
judge (selected by the Chief Justice) to divide the court into divisions of three or
more judges to render judgment.121 Although the court was granted “the powers
of a district court with respect to the jurisdiction conferred on it,” it was
explicitly denied the authority “to issue any temporary restraining order or
interlocutory decree staying or restraining, in whole or in part, the effectiveness”
of certain regulations or orders.122 A petition for a writ of certiorari could be
filed in the Supreme Court within thirty days of a judgment or order by the
111. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 251).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1585.
113. Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532. Prior to that time, the U.S. Customs Court
was considered a legislative court. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 457–58 (1929).
114. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 101, 94 Stat. 1727, 1727 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 251).
115. See Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, sec. 28, § 29, 36 Stat. 11, 91, 105–08; Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. at 458.
116. Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, § 1, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475.
117. Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 1, 72 Stat. 848, 848.
118. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, 96 Stat. 25.
119. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, §1(a), 56 Stat. 23, 23–4.
120. See id. §§ 201, 204(a)–(c), 56 Stat. at 29, 31–32.
121. Id. § 204(c), 56 Stat. at 32.
122. Id.
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court.123 Although the court was created as part of a temporary measure,
Congress repeatedly renewed the authority, expanding its jurisdiction to include
review of agency decisions under the Housing and Rent Acts of 1948 and 1949
as well as Defense Production Act.124 In 1961, the court heard its final case.125
It formally dissolved April 18, 1962.126
In 1971, Congress created a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, again
consisting of three or more judges to be designated by the Chief Justice from the
judges of the district courts and circuit courts of appeals.127 Like the prior court,
the temporary one, which operated until 1993,128 served as an Article III court.129
Congress provided it with circuit court powers relating to wage and price control
programs, with some exceptions.130
The controversial (and short-lived) Commerce Court (1910–1913) acted as an
Article III court as well.131 Largely a pet project of President William Howard
Taft, the Court had exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to orders issued by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).132 Appeal was via a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court.133 The Court consisted of five judges appointed for
overlapping five-year terms.134 Upon their appointment, the first round of
judges simultaneously received appointments to different circuit courts of
appeal, where they could hear cases as needed. At the conclusion of their term,
they continued to sit on the circuit court to which they had been appointed, with
replacements drawn from individuals already appointed to the federal bench.135

123. Id. § 204(d), 56 Stat. at 32.
124. See Housing and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 161, sec. 202(d), § 204(e)(4), 62 Stat. 93, 95–97;
Housing and Rent Act of 1949, ch. 42, sec. 203(d)(5), (e), § 204(e)(1), (e)(4)(E), 63 Stat. 18, 23–
24; Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, §§ 407(d), 408, 64 Stat. 798, 808–11; see also
Emergency Court of Appeals, 1942-1962, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/
emergency-court-appeals-1942-1962 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
125. Emergency Court of Appeals, 1942-1962, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/
courts/emergency-court-appeals-1942-1962 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
126. See Emergency Court of Appeals, 1942–1962, supra note 124.
127. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, sec. 2, § 211(b),
85 Stat. 743, 748–49.
128. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 102(d), 106 Stat.
4506, 4507.
129. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187–88 (1943); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proc. in Petroleum Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. 150, 830 F.2d 198, 202–04 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1987); Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1251 (D.D.C. 1977).
130. Economic Stabilization Act, § 211, 85 Stat. at 748–50; Spinetti v. Atl. Richfield Co., 522
F.2d 1401, 1403 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
131. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539.
132. Commerce Court, 1910-1913, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/
commerce-court-1910-1913 (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
133. Id.
134. 36 Stat. at 540.
135. Dan Ernst, The U.S. Commerce Court, 1910–1913, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (May 19, 2015),
http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-us-commerce-court-1910-1913.html.
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Congress provided the Commerce Court with full powers of a circuit court in
regard to cases within its jurisdiction as well as the ability to “issue all writs and
process appropriate.”136 The first Chief Judge of the Court, Martin Knapp, had
previously served as chair of the ICC.137 He had a clear interest in keeping what
he perceived of as industrial control of the ICC in check.138 In reflection of this
position, the court went on to overturn a number of ICC decisions, which the
Supreme Court subsequently restored.139 Judge Robert W. Archibald’s
impeachment in July 1912 for using his position to secure railroad contracts for
his cronies generated renewed Congressional effort to abolish the court.140 Taft,
however, vetoed the bill.141 Nevertheless, the following year, with President
Woodrow Wilson’s support, Congress eliminated the tribunal.142
In the early 1970s, a number of railways in the midwest and northeast of the
United States filed for bankruptcy. Congress responded by passing the 1974
Regional Rail Reorganization Act.143 The statute reorganized railroads into an
economically viable system, established the U.S. Railway Association and the
Consolidated Rail Corporation, and provided assistance to states and local and
regional transportation authorities to promote rail travel.144 It also established a
special court, composed of three federal judges assigned by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation.145 The judges were given the authority to exercise
the powers of district court judges.146 In 1996, Congress provided for the
abolition of the Court under the Federal Courts Improvement Act.147
The Court of Claims, established in 1855, initially operated as an
administrative body and, later, as an Article I tribunal.148 The originating statute
directed the court to hear and determine claims against the U.S. government, as
well as claims referred to the court by either the Senate or the House of
Representatives.149 In 1863, Congress authorized the court to render final
judgments, from which an appeal could follow under certain circumstances.150
136. 36 Stat. at 541.
137. Dan Ernst, The U.S. Commerce Court, 1910–1913, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (May 19, 2015),
http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/the-us-commerce-court-1910-1913.html.
138. Id.
139. In four of the Court’s first five cases, it reversed ICC orders, and in each instance, the
Supreme Court restored the original ICC order. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219.
143. Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (1974).
144. Id.§ 101(b), 87 Stat. at 986.
145. Id. § 209(b), 87 Stat. at 999–1000.
146. Id.
147. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, sec. 605, § 209(2), 110 Stat. 3847, 3858.
148. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, 612. See infra Part II.C. for further
discussion of the Court of Claims and U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
149. § 1, 10 Stat. at 612.
150. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, §§ 3, 5, 12 Stat. 765, 765, 766.
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In 1953, Congress declared that the Court of Claims was an Article III court.151
Nine years later, the Supreme Court confirmed the court’s status (along with the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals), noting that because the judges were
constitutionally protected in regard to their tenure of office and undiminished
compensation, they were eligible to sit as Court of Appeals and U.S. District
Court judges.152 In 1982, however, Congress turned the tribunal back into an
Article I Court.153 It continues to operate as such, subject to review in the
(Article III) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.154
C. Inherent Powers Central to Article III, Section 1 Courts
The inherent powers of all Article III, Section 1 courts are rooted in their
constitutional responsibility to administer justice and their status as the third
branch of government.155 They divide into inherent powers that (1) ensure the
judiciary can fulfill its obligation to ensure fairness in the course of adjudication;
(2) facilitate the efficient use of judicial resources; and (3) protect the integrity,
independence, and reputation of the courts. Within each category, powers that
go to the core of the courts operating in their constitutional capacity (i.e., in the
exercise of “the judicial power”) are considered essential and thus beyond the
reach of the other two branches.156 They are part and parcel of the separation of
powers that marks the federal system. Such authorities can be distinguished
from inherent powers that are merely beneficial, in which case Congress may
have some role to play in their demarcation.157
1. Ensure Fairness and Justice in the Course of Adjudication
Federal courts have certain inherent powers that enable them to fulfill their
substantive responsibility to ensure fairness and justice in the course of
adjudication. While Congress may act to facilitate the overall objective, certain
authorities do not rely on any legislative framing. To obtain equitable results,
courts must be able to obtain accurate facts. By extending their purview to cases
in equity, Article III, Section 2 provides an underlying authority to do this—a
power further recognized (but not solely constructed) by Congress in the first

151. Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, sec. 1, § 171, 67 Stat. 226, 226.
152. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569–71 (1962).
153. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, sec. 105, § 171, 96 Stat.
25, 27 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171); see also Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553,
581 (1933).
154. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171(a); see also Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-572, § 902(a)(1), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (assigning the name “United States Court of Federal
Claims”).
155. See, e.g., Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920); Michaelson v. United States, 266
U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924); In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993).
156. See Barrett, supra note 11.
157. See Barrett, supra note 11.
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Judiciary Act.158 Accordingly, Article III, Section 1 courts can appoint auditors,
special masters, and commissioners to make investigations.159 They can use
discovery procedures in habeas cases.160 Article III judges can allow post-trial
depositions.161 They can require the production of witness statements and
parties to attend hearings regarding missing evidence.162 They can make in
limine rulings.163 Article III entities have inherent authority to exclude, admit,
or strike evidence or exhibits on grounds of fairness.164 They also have the
inherent power to issue and answer letters rogatory to obtain evidence from an
individual within the jurisdiction of a foreign court.165 This is done as a matter
of parity between the judicial functions of internationally-recognized
governments.166
Pari passu, lower courts have recognized the judiciary’s power to ensure that
matters of law are addressed. For example, they can require parties to enter
memoranda of law.167 They can require counsel to serve standby.168 They can
require parties to retain a lawyer.169 They can assign attorneys for pretrial
actions.170 And they can appoint amici curiae.171 For the sake of consistency,
courts have the power, derived from common law, to ensure stare decisis as a
matter of both horizontal and vertical parity.172
158. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 19, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
159. See Peterson, 253 U.S. at 304–07, 312–14; Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir.
1982), amended in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 1956); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) 123, 127–29 (1864).
160. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969).
161. United States ex rel. Consol. Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 929 F.2d 1089, 1091–92
(5th Cir. 1991).
162. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668–69 (1957); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11–12 (1st Cir. 1985).
163. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984).
164. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir.
1992); Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 712 (4th Cir. 1986); Admiral Theatre Corp. v.
Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 897–98 (8th Cir. 1978).
165. In re Letter Rogatory from Just. Ct., Dist. of Montreal, Can., 523 F.2d 562, 564 (6th Cir.
1975) (“[I]t has been held that federal courts have inherent power to issue and respond to letters
rogatory.”) (citing United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 173 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Staples, 256 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1958); In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 256–57 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1887)).
166. In re Letter Rogatory, 523 F.2d at 563 n.1 (quoting The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D.
La. 1941)).
167. Alameda v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980).
168. United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018 (3d Cir. 1993).
169. See J.D. Pharm. Distribs., Inc. v. Save-On Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201,
1208–09 (11th Cir. 1990).
170. In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on Dec. 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1011–12
(5th Cir. 1977).
171. In re Utils. Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1937).
172. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
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The courts have further inherent authorities related to the conduct of trials.
They can, for instance, withdraw a juror mid-trial where it would be “a total
failure of justice if the trial proceed[ed].”173 They can fine jurors who try to
leave without permission.174 They can discharge a jury from delivering a
verdict.175 They can excise jury determinations and order a reduction in an
excessive verdict.176 Notably, nowhere can remittitur be found in statutory
form.177 They can rescind a discharge order and recall the jury for further
deliberation.178 So, too, can they mediate the impact of common law rules of
procedure.179 These powers are not established by Congress. They are entirely
within the courts’ authority qua the judicial branch of government.
Article III, Section 1 courts also have the (essential) power to make decisions
that are not subject to control by the other branches.180 When they act in this
core judicial capacity, separation of powers prevents the other branches from
interfering. To give effect to their determinations, this extends to the ability to
control and review their decisions. If it did not, the other branches could simply
intervene after the fact effectively nullify judicial decisionmaking by preventing
it from reaching the public domain. As a consequence, as the Supreme Court
explained in Nixon v. Warner Communications, “[e]very court has supervisory
power over its own records and files.”181 They can seal, unseal, revoke, or
rescind orders.182 They can modify or lift protective orders.183 This power

173. United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622, 623 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858).
174. Offutt v. Parrott, 18 F. Cas. 606, 607 (C.C.D.C. 1803) (No. 10,453) (fining a juror who
jumped out a window to try to escape jury service).
175. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
176. The first recorded use of remittitur was by Justice Joseph Story. See Blunt v. Little, 3 F.
Cas. 760, 762 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578); see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 829. Even though
the rules provide for the grant of a new trial, it remains a judicial power. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
177. Barrett, supra note 11, at 829. Remittur is constitutionally assigned to the Courts in their
Article III, Section 2 grant of equitable authority. In contrast, additur, which is not an equitable
remedy, has not been allowed in federal court. See Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 482 (1935).
178. Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 43–44 (2016).
179. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933).
180. See Pushaw, Jr., supra note 11, at 742–43.
181. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). Accord Gambale v. Deutsche
Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal
Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
182. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1943); United
States v. Seugasala, 670 F. App’x 641, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d
948, 983 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1987). This includes
the authority to revoke orders granting bail. Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961).
183. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Poliquin v.
Garden Way, Inc. 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[A] protective order, like any ongoing
injunction, is always subject to the inherent power of the district court to relax or terminate the
order, even after judgment.”); Gambale, 377 F.3d at 141 (citing Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 143–
45).

568

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:543

persists even when jurisdiction over the relevant controversy has ended.184
Jurisdiction over the sealed record is not lost when the case is appealed.185
2. Facilitate the Efficient Use of Resources
In 1936, the Supreme Court recognized the inherent authority of the judiciary
to manage its affairs with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution
of cases.186 In 2017, the Court reiterated its position, noting that the judiciary
has the power, conferred by neither rules nor statutes, “to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”187
While dockets may in many circumstances be mandatory (excepting, for
instance, the certiorari process), Article III courts control how that docket is
handled.188
Article III, Section 1 courts can, for instance, demand that defense counsel
commit to a date for trial.189 They determine the order in which issues will be
considered.190 They can initiate proceedings by declaring parties ready for
trial.191 They can consolidate questions involving common law and fact,192 as
well as entire cases.193 Relatedly, they can stay an action pending the completion
of a related action in another court.194 Courts can restrict pretrial hearing
length.195 And they can implement a range of restrictions in the conduct of trial,
such as limits on the number of expert witnesses.196 They can require parties to

184. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (“As
long as a protective order remains in effect, the court that entered the order retains the power to
modify it, even if the underlying suit has been dismissed.”).
185. Seugasala, 670 F. App’x at 641.
186. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
187. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (quoting Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)); see also In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st
Cir. 2002); Arthur Pierson & Co., v. Provimi Veal Corp., 887 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1989).
188. See Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1805 (1995).
189. United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 430–31 (5th Cir. 1998).
190. Marine Chance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1998).
191. See Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 728 F.2d 730, 732 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984).
192. Bowen v. Chase, 94 U.S. 812, 824 (1877). This power was later acknowledged by statute.
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
193. MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958).
194. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971);
La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27–29 (1959); Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315, 332–33 (1943); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941).
195. See J.D. Pharm. Distribs., Inc. v. Save-On Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201, 1209
(11th Cir. 1990).
196. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Guynes, 713 F.2d 1187, 1193 (5th Cir. 1983); but see United
States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2005).
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have representatives with settlement authority.197 They can limit the amount of
time counsel can speak.198 On similar grounds (and subject to appellate review),
courts on their own authority can dismiss an action on grounds of forum non
conveniens199—despite the fact that a parallel authority has been established
statutorily.200
3. Protect the Integrity, Independence, and Reputation of the Judiciary
As their own branch of government Article III, Section 1 courts also have the
inherent power to protect the integrity, independence, and reputation of the
judiciary. Like matters that go to the heart of adjudication, these authorities are
protected, under separation of powers doctrine, from interference by the other
branches. The judiciary, for instance, has the inherent authority to prevent fraud
on the court.201 They can launch their own, independent investigation.202 And
they can set aside decisions if they are later found to be rooted in fraudulent
representation.203 This power is rooted in the extension of Supreme Court
jurisdiction to cases in equity under Article III, Section 2. Along similar lines,
Article III, Section 1 courts have the inherent authority to sanction contumacious
behavior, such as failure to prosecute.204 The judiciary can penalize parties for
litigating in bad faith.205 The court can fine an attorney when a party has “acted
197. In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see also In re Novak, 932
F.2d 1397, 1406–07 (11th Cir. 1991); Luis C. Forteza e Hijos, Inc. v. Mills, 534 F.2d 415, 418–19
(1st Cir. 1976).
198. See United States v. Maloof, 205 F.3d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gray,
No 95-10405, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12983, at *9 (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 1997); Sims v. ANR Freight
Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 1996).
199. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1947); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 44 (1991).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
201. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Harford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245–46 (1946) (first case in
which fraud was declared within inherent powers).
202. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refin. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
203. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245–46. As the Supreme Court explained, the “historic power
of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments” is central to judicial integrity because
“tampering with the administration of justice in [this] manner . . . involves far more than an injury
to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safe-guard the public.”
Id. at 245, 246; see also Universal Oil Prods. Co., 328 U.S. at 580 (citing Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S.
238); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (quoting Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245,
246).
204. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962). Following repeated prosecutorial
delays, the Court explained that its authority “to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution [is] an
‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Id.;
see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630–31).
205. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45. This is one of the ancient powers of the courts, which dates
back (at least) to the early 17th century. See An Acte to Reforme the Multitudes and Misdemeanors
of Attorneyes and Sollicitors at Lawe, 3 Jac. c. 7 (1605) (Eng.); 1 WILLIAM TIDD, THE PRACTICE
OF THE COURTS OF KING’S BENCH, AND COMMON PLEAS, IN PERSONAL ACTIONS, AND
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in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”206 It goes to the
court’s ability to ensure that its own operations are regarded as just. It thus
“transcends a court’s equitable power concerning relations between the parties
and reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself.”207 Even where there are
procedural rules in place, courts can impose sanctions under their inherent
powers.208 This includes sanctioning a party for “delaying or disrupting the
litigation, or by hampering enforcement of a court order.”209 And courts can go
further: in some circumstances, they can dismiss an appeal or complaint
entirely.210
Contempt, too, falls within this category. Traditionally, it has been understood
to mean misconduct in the presence of the court, disobeying court orders, or
misbehavior by judicial officers. Despite considerable legislation governing this
area, there are numerous cases in which the Court has underscored its own,
inherent authority, distinct from the statutory basis.211 In 1821, the Court
explained that Article III entities are “universally acknowledged to be vested, by
their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, and as a corollary to this
proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and
insults of pollution.”212 Certain “auxiliary and subordinate” powers can be
exercised by the courts where they are “indispensable to the attainment of the
ends” specified.213 In 1874, it wrote:
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and
EJECTMENT 60–61 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 4th Am. ed. 1856). The Supreme Court first
recognized this power in 1824 and has frequently reaffirmed it. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 765–66 (1980); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183–84 (2017)
(holding that federal courts have inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct).
206. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975) (quoting
F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)); see also
Pushaw, Jr., supra note 11, at 765 (referring to sanctioning for contumacious behavior as a
“comprehensive legislative sanctioning scheme”).
207. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46.
208. Id. at 49–50.
209. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
210. See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976); In re Prevot, 59
F.3d 556, 565–66 (6th Cir. 1995); D.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 736 F.2d 1, 3–4
(1st Cir. 1984).
211. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (giving federal judges “discretion”
to punish “by fine or imprisonment . . . all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before
the [court.]”); United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); United
States v. Duane, 25 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 14,997) (citing common law roots of
judicial authority).
212. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).
213. Id. at 225–26.
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writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of
justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into
existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became
possessed of this power.214
Fifty years later, the Court reiterated its position, recognizing that it had a duty
to punish for contempt.215 Without the ability to enforce its orders, the Court
could not function. As it later explained, “[t]he underlying concern that gave
rise to the contempt power was not . . . merely the disruption of court
proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary,
regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct of trial.”216
They similarly can sanction attorneys for “willful disobedience of a court
order.”217 This authority goes to the essential power of Article III, Section 1
entities as the judicial branch of government.
The range of options available is broad: courts can appoint an attorney to
prosecute defendants for criminal contempt. They can levy the cost of
litigation.218 They can bar individuals disrupting a trial from the courtroom.219
Judges can require “silence, respect, and decorum” in their presence.220 And
they can influence bar admission and discipline.221 While such power “ought to
be exercised with great caution,” it is nevertheless “incidental to all Courts.”222
II. ENUMERATED POWERS TRIBUNALS: ARTICLE I, SECTION 8
The earliest doctrinal distinction between Article III courts and Article I courts
is said to have come in 1828 with the Supreme Court’s decision in American

214. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874).
215. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (“[A] judge must have and exercise
[powers of contempt] in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice, and in maintaining
the authority and dignity of the court . . . .”). See also Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago,
St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) (“[T]he power to punish for contempts is inherent
in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the
administration of justice.”).
216. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987). See also
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
217. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). See also
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (“[T]he inherent power extends to a full range
of litigation abuses.”)
218. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 428 (1923).
219. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343–44, 345–47 (1970); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44
(citing Allen, 397 U.S. 337).
220. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.), 204, 227 (1821); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43
(quoting Anderson, 19 U.S. at 227).
221. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,
447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980).
222. Burr, 22 U.S. at 531; see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burr, 22 U.S. at 531);
cf. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812) (some implied powers are “necessary to the exercise of all others”)).
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Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton.223 In it, the Court had to determine the
legal status of the Superior Court of Florida, a territorial court established by
Congress.224 It concluded that the legislature could carve out a domain not
subject to Article III.225 In his analysis, Chief Justice Marshall underscored the
fact that upon appointment to the territorial court, judges did not enjoy life
tenure.226 Instead, they held office for four years:
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can
be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative
Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which
exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the
territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which
they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined
in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in
the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over
the territories of the United States.227
Although Article III reserved “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction”
to courts established under its auspices, “the same limitation does not extend to
the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers
of the general [i.e., federal], and . . . state government.”228 Legislative courts
could therefore be distinguished both by the constitutional protections extended
to the judges, as well as the type of power being exercised.
Marshall’s endorsement of the legitimacy of the Floridian territorial court in
Canter relied on the text of Article IV, as well as “the general right of
sovereignty” residing in government. Reference to this case as establishing the
distinction between Article III and “Article I” courts therefore can only amount
to a shorthand way of saying that territorial courts are brought into being by
Congress. The authority underpinning their creation derives from a different
part of the Constitution. Nevertheless, Canter is frequently cited in reference to
the distinction between Article III courts and what are referred to as “Article I,”
“legislative,” or “non-constitutional” tribunals.
Certainly, there is an important distinction to be drawn: Article I tribunals
cannot exercise the judicial power of the United States, even as, under separation
of powers doctrine, the other branches cannot interfere in the inner workings of
Article III entities. Courts thus must at times delineate which entities fall into

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) [hereinafter Canter].
Id. at 523.
See id. at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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which category.229 In the 1865 case of Gordon v. United States, the Supreme
Court considered the status of the Court of Claims.230 Initially, Chief Justice
Taney determined that because it was essentially a legislative body, no appeal
would lie from it to the Supreme Court.231 Taney died in 1864, before his
decision issued.232 In 1865, the case was reargued.233 While the decision was
pending, Congress repealed the statutory language to which Taney had pointed
to deny jurisdiction.234 The Court, accordingly, shifted its position and claimed
jurisdiction over final judgments from the court.235
In the time that has elapsed since Gordon, Supreme Court authority over the
rulings of legislative courts has turned on the type of proceeding and the finality
of the judgment. The Court does not review administrative proceedings. But
where legislative courts exercise judicial proceedings, carry a final decision, and
involve the exercise of Article III judicial functions, federal courts may have
appellate jurisdiction.236 In the 2018 case Ortiz v. United States, for example,
the Court reaffirmed that the military justice system is essentially judicial in
character.237 The rationale behind the Court’s determination is that where
Article III jurisdiction is being exercised, then Article III protections are
necessary.
The constitutional nexus for courts in this category lies in Article I, Section
8’s explicit grant of powers to the legislature. Most prominently, Article I,
Section 8, Clause 9 provides for Congress “to constitute tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court.”238 Two points here deserve notice: first, as a substantive
matter, the laws and types of issues to come before entities created under Article
I, Section 8, Clause 9 is cabined by the powers granted to the legislature in
Article I, Section 8. These types of courts, accordingly, find root both in Article
I, Section 8, Clause 9 and in the other enumerated powers of Article I, Section
8.
229. See, e.g., Giorgio Foods, Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2007) (“The Customs Court was an Article I court, while this court, as a result of the Customs Act
of 1980, is an Article III court, with the same power as a district court.”); Int’l Fid. Ins. Co. v. Sweet
Little Mex. Corp., 665 F.3d 671, 678 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting the language from Giorgio).
230. See Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865).
231. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 698–700, 706 (1865), appending 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
561 (1865).
232. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 477–78 (1886).
233. Id.
234. See Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
235. De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867); see also Jones, 119 U.S. 477
(Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction over an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims).
236. See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2172–81 (2018); Pope v. United States, 323
U.S. 1, 14 (1944); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–83 (1983). Note that this is
also the position that Congress appears to endorse. CONG. RSCH. SERV., CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 1129, at 673
(Centennial ed. 2017).
237. Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2174.
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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Second, the language of Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 departs in significant
ways from Article III, Section 1, in which “the judicial power” may be vested
“in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”239 To “ordain” is to order, or to officially “establish . . . by
appointment, decree, or law.”240 Thus, under Article III, Section 1, it is up to
Congress to determine—i.e., to ordain—which courts are inferior to the
Supreme Court and thereby carry the judicial power. Congress thus creates and
designates which courts constitute the third branch. In contrast, the use of the
word “tribunals” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 suggests the power to constitute
adjudicatory bodies that do not necessarily exercise “the judicial power,” but
which ultimately (because of their inferiority) fall under Supreme Court
jurisdiction.241 This power, then, is the heart of Congress’s authority, as cabined
by the substantive, enumerated powers, to create Article I, Section 8 courts
wherein appeal is to Article III.
Consistent with this clause, Congress has acted under a number of its
authorities to constitute Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 tribunals. Under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17, which establishes Congressional control over the territory
in which the seat of government is located, Congress has established courts in
the District of Columbia.242 Other specialized Article I, Section 8, Clause 9
tribunals focus on taxation,243 bankruptcy,244 post offices and roads,245
copyrights and patents,246 and the constitution and governance of the military
and militia.247 An associated implied power relates to Congressional authority
over immigration, under which it has created immigration tribunals.248 Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18 goes on to provide residual power to constitute the
tribunals in a manner consistent with what is necessary and proper to give effect
to the substantive enumerated powers, as well as to bring the tribunals
themselves into operation.249
A final point to make about Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 tribunals in contrast
to other types of federal courts is the temporal priority afforded to the legislature:
239. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
240. Ordain, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ordain (last
visited Mar. 31, 2022).
241. See also Pfander, supra note 9 (underscoring the distinction between “court” and
“tribunal”).
242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
243. Id. § 8, cl. 1.
244. Id. § 8, cl. 4.
245. Id. § 8, cl. 7.
246. Id. § 8, cl. 8.
247. Id. § 8, cl. 11 (“Captures on Land and Water”), cl. 12 (“raise and support Armies”), cl. 13
(“provide and maintain a Navy”), cl. 14 (“make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces”); cls. 15–16 (“calling forth the Militia”).
248. See The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581, 603–
4 (1889).
249. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Congress is the first mover in bringing such tribunals into existence. In this
sense, these entities differ from the Article II, Section 2/Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 treaty bodies, which can best be understood in terms of hybrid powers.
In the latter case, the Executive acts in the first instance to reach international
agreement, as a necessary but not sufficient precondition to Congress acting on
its Commerce Clause authorities to bring such entities into being.250 They are
not thus properly solely creatures of the legislative branch. A brief discussion
of the enumerated courts follows.
A. District of Columbia: Article I, Section 8, Clause 17
The status of the courts of the District of Columbia has alternated over time.
A series of decisions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries underscored the
position of the tribunals as legislative courts, established under Congress’s
plenary power to govern the District of Columbia.251 Congress could therefore
assign them non-judicial functions. For instance, the Supreme Court of the
District, renamed in 1936 the District Court of the United States for the District
of Columbia,252 held revisory powers over patent issues, with decisions binding
on the Commissioner of Patents.253 It held similar authority over public utilities
commissions fixed rates,254 as the D.C. Court of Appeals had over orders of the
Federal Radio Commission.255
Although the U.S. Supreme Court had previously stated in dictum that the
courts of the District of Columbia were legislative (i.e., non-Article III)
courts,256 in 1933 it held that they were constitutional courts, exercising the full
judicial power of the United States when they adjudicated cases or controversies
under Article III.257 Simultaneously, insofar as the courts carried non-judicial
functions, they comported with Congress’s U.S. Const. Article I, Section 8,
Clause 17 powers.258 The Supreme Court considered Article III, Section 1 as
limiting these authorities only in regard to tenure and compensation, but not in
regard to vesting legislative and administrative powers in the courts.259 The
Court explained, “Congress has as much power to vest courts of the District with
250. See discussion, Part V, infra.
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468
(1930) (“[T]he courts of the District of Columbia are not created under the judiciary article of the
Constitution but are legislative courts.”); see also Wilber Griffith Katz, Federal Legislative Courts,
43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 899–903 (1930).
252. Act of June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921.
253. Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 60 (1884).
254. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 438–40, 442–44 (1923).
255. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. at 466–68.
256. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 446–48 (1929).
257. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933), superseded by statute, District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 111, 84
Stat. 473, 475 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (West 2019)).
258. O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 545–46.
259. Id. at 544–45.
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a variety of jurisdiction and powers as a state legislature has in conferring
jurisdiction on its courts.”260
In 1970, Congress passed a statute that distinguished between Washington
D.C.’s Article III courts (the Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia), and Article I courts (the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia).261 It assigned matters of local
concern to the local court system, in which the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals acted as the highest court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit was given jurisdiction of appeals from judgments of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals on matters related to federal criminal
law.262 Three years later, the Supreme Court upheld this distinction in Palmore
v. United States.263 The defendant, who had been convicted by the Superior
Court of D.C. of a felony in violation of the D.C. Code, argued that he had a
Constitutional right to be tried before an Article III judge.264 The Court
disagreed: “[T]he requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of
national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake, must in proper
circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress
to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and
warranting distinctive treatment.”265 Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 included the
authority to try local criminal cases before judges who did not have life tenure
or protections against an undiminished salary.266 Pari passu, state courts, as
well as territorial courts, could take on questions relating to federal law.
The current Superior Court of the District of Columbia is comprised of a chief
judge and sixty-one associate judges nominated by the President after
recommendation from the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination
Commission.267 The commission operates by releasing a notice of any judicial
vacancy and then provides three names to the President for each opening, one of
which the President selects.268 That individual is then confirmed by the Senate
for terms of fifteen years.269 The court has jurisdiction over any civil action or
other matter (at law or in equity) brought in D.C. unless exclusive jurisdiction
lies with federal court in the District.270 It also has jurisdiction over certain
criminal matters, violations of the rules and regulations of the Washington
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 545.
District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act § 111, 84 Stat. 473, 475.
§ 111, 84 Stat. at 476; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-301 (West 2019).
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 406–07, 410 (1973).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 407–08.
See id. at 410.
See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-903, 1-204.33 (West 2019).
See id. § 1-204.34(d)(1).
§ 1-204.31(c).
§ 11-921(a), (b).
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Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, certain child custody cases, the issuance
of warrants for arrest, search or seizure or electronic surveillance in connection
with crimes and offenses committed within Washington, D.C., or for
administrative inspections linked to public health, safety, and welfare.271 It has
subpoena authority and contempt power.272 The court’s business is governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as modified by the court.273 Any changes, however, must be
approved by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.274
The court’s decisions are reviewable by the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals,275 which is comprised of a chief justice and eight associate justices
appointed in the same manner and for the same period as judges of the Superior
Court.276 Its business is conducted according to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, with whatever modifications the court makes to them.277 As the
highest court for the District of Columbia, the D.C. Court of Appeals is the
equivalent of a state supreme court, with its decisions reviewable by the U.S.
Supreme Court on matters of federal law.
B. Military
The use of military tribunals derives from English history in which the ability
of the Crown to constitute such tribunals transformed over time to a
Parliamentary power. Prior to the Glorious Revolution and establishment of the
English Bill of Rights, the Crown promulgated its own Articles of War, which
established rules for the conduct of the military and the procedures for trying
their violation.278 An exercise of royal prerogative, such rules issued at the start
of hostilities and ceased operation thereafter.279 Martial law held no quarter in
peacetime.280 In 1689, however, despite the defeat of James II, a significant
271. §§ 11-923, 11-924, 11-925, 11-941.
272. §§ 11-942, 11-944.
273. § 11-946.
274. Id.
275. § 11-721.
276. See id. §§ 11-702, 1-204.31(c); For the current designation of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, see District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, §
111, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 475, 491 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101, 11-1501
(West 2019)).
277. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-743 (West 2019).
278. See FRANCIS LIEBER & G. NORMAN LIEBER, TO SAVE THE COUNTRY: A LOST TREATISE
ON MARIAL LAW 110–11, 114–17 (Will Smiley & John Fabian Witt eds., 2019); WILLIAM
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 5-7 (rev. & enlarged 2d ed. 1920); W.S.
Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered, 18 L.Q. REV. 117, 118–21 (1902). Such
Articles were issued, for instance, by Charles I in 1629 and 1639, Charles II in 1666 during the
conflict with the Dutch, and James II in 1685 in the context of Monmouth’s Rebellion. FRANCIS
LIEBER & G. NORMAN LIEBER, TO SAVE THE COUNTRY: A LOST TREATISE ON MARIAL LAW 110–
11 (Will Smiley & John Fabian Witt eds., 2019).
279. Eugene O. Porter, The Articles of War, 8 HISTORIAN 77, 84 (1946).
280. Petition of Right, 1627, 3. Car. 1, c. 1, § 7 (Eng.).
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portion of the British army remained loyal to him.281 Parliament passed its first
Mutiny Act, reflecting both the constitutional principle forbidding standing
armies absent Parliamentary consent, and that, as a practical matter, the
contemporary instability required the keeping of forces “for the Safety of the
Kingdome for the Common Defence of the Protestant Religion and for the
reduceing [sic] of Ireland.”282 The legislation made desertion, mutiny, and
sedition a crime.283 Thereafter, in recognition of the prohibition against standing
armies, Parliament annually renewed the statute.284
The Crown continued to issue Articles of War in the context of active
hostilities, which, by the time of the American Revolution, led to the emergence
of a complex set of rules.285 Colonial legislatures followed Britain’s lead by
passing regulations for disciplining their militias.286 In the colony of Virginia,
the House of Burgesses lifted language directly from the English statute,
providing for courts-martial “to inflict corporal punishment, not extending to life
or limb, on any soldier for immoralities, misbehaviour, or neglect of duty.”287
The Massachusetts Bay code of military justice, similarly adopted by
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina,
reflected the British Code of 1765.288
At the drafting of the Constitution, the authority to form a military and to issue
rules for its operation transferred to Congress through Article I, Section 8,
Clauses 10, 11, 14, and 16. Nine Article I, Section 8 courts currently in
existence, and numerous courts over the course of U.S. history, have been
introduced under these authorities.289 They divide into three categories, each of
which has a distinct history, constitutional grounding, and appellate structure:
courts-martial, military commissions, and veterans’ benefits courts, each of
which is discussed below. Military tribunals can be further distinguished from
the other Article I, Section 8 courts in that they depend for their execution (in

281. WINTHROP, supra note 278, at 19–20.
282. Mutiny Act 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 5 (Eng.).
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Mutiny Act 1764, 4 Geo. 3 c. 3 (Eng.); Mutiny Act 1765, 5 Geo. 3 c. 7; Mutiny
Act 1766, 6 Geo. 3 c. 8 (Eng.); Mutiny Act 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c. 10 (Eng.); Mutiny Act 1768, 8 Geo.
3 c. 3 (Eng.).
285. See Mutiny Act 1776, 16 Geo. 3 c. 2 (Eng.).
286. See, e.g., Mutiny Act (Pa. 1756), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/0106-02-0189; An Act for preventing Mutiny and Desertion (Va. 1757), in 7 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF
THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619 87, 87–88 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond 1820).
287. David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46
VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 17–18 n.74 (2005).
288. WINTHROP, supra note 278, at 22 n.32.
289. These courts are the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, Army Court of Criminal
Appeals, Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals,
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Court of Military Commissions Review, Court of Appeals
for Veterans’ Claims, and the ad hoc courts-martial and military commissions.

Summer 2022]

Federal Courts

579

part) upon the President’s position of the Executive as the “Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”290
1. Courts-martial: Articles I, Section 8, Clauses 14 and 16
The first category of military tribunal regulates active servicemembers,
ensuring good order and discipline within the military.291 This is the traditional
courts-martial system, which Congress increasingly mirrors on the Article III
system. It contains a three-tiered structure: courts-martial, the four courts of
criminal appeals, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the
decisions of which are reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court).292
The system itself pre-dates the Constitution: in 1775, the Second Continental
Congress passed sixty-nine Articles of War, establishing courts-martial to
adjudicate their violation.293 The rules drew extensively from the British Code
of 1765 and the corresponding Massachusetts Bay requirements for its militia.294
A year later, Congress expanded the Articles.295 Further revisions occurred, the
most notable of which being the shift in 1786 from requiring thirteen members
on general courts-martial to five, and five for special courts-martial to three.296
In 2016, the Military Justice Act expanded special courts-martial to four
members, general courts-martial to eight, and twelve members for capital
cases.297
Courts-martial were held with regularity during the Revolutionary War and
early America.298 It was only natural that the Constitutional Convention went
on to lodge the authority to constitute such laws and tribunals in Congress,
empowering it “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces,” and “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the

290. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
291. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (“A court-martial. . . remains to a
significant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is
preserved.”), overruled on other grounds by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987).
292. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 166–69 (1994).
293. See American Articles of War, art. XXXII, reprinted in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341,
349 n.15 (1952); WINTHROP, supra note 278, at 47–48, 953–59.
294. WINTHROP, supra note 278, at 22 n.32.
295. JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., U.S. ARMY, THE BACKGROUND OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE 2 (1959), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/backgroundUCMJ.pdf.
296. Act of May 31, 1786, 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 317–
22 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904–37). See also WINTHROP, supra note 278, at 22–23.
297. Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, sec. 5187, § 829, 130 Stat. 2894, 2903
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 829).
298. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 42 n.14 (1942) (listing nearly 20 instances of military
tribunals being used, of which only the first two were not courts-martial).
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Service of the United States.”299 When the U.S. Constitution came into effect,
the First Congress adopted the Articles of War of 1776 to govern the Army.300
Soon thereafter, Congress passed a statute providing for governance of the Navy,
which similarly provided for courts-martial.301 In recognition of the shift from
the Articles of Confederation, in 1806 Congress formally enacted 101 Articles
of War, which remained in force for the next seven decades.302
In 1857, the Supreme Court ruled that such tribunals are not subject to Article
III requirements.303 To the contrary, the relevant provisions
show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now
practiced by civilized nations; and that the power to do so is given
without any connection between it and the 3d article of the
Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States; indeed,
that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.304
The Civil War prompted numerous changes to the code.305 In 1874, Congress
codified the Articles of War.306
In 1916, Congress re-enacted the Articles of War, vesting the military
tribunals with the jurisdiction to try and to punish servicemembers for violations
of both state and federal law.307 They subsequently underwent numerous
revisions. The 1920 Articles of War, for instance, required the convening
authority to appoint a defense counsel for both special and general courts
(although it did not need to be an attorney).308 Starting in 1921, they were
accompanied by a Manual for Courts-Martial, which detailed the procedural

299. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 14, 16; see also Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2165, 2175
(2018).
300. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96.
301. See Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, art. 17, 2 Stat. 45, 47; id. art. 35, 2 Stat. at 50.
302. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 359; JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., supra note 295, at
2–3.
303. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857).
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (giving courts martial during
times of “war, insurrection, or rebellion” the authority to punish capital offenses committed by
members of the armed services).
306. 14 Rev. Stat. § 1342 (1875).
307. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 650.
308. See Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, ch. II, 41 Stat. 759, 787, 790; see also Act of July 9,
1918, ch. 143, ch. X, 40 Stat. 845, 882–83 (amending arts. 52, 53, 57, 112); Act of Feb. 28, 1919,
ch. 81, 40 Stat. 1211 (amending art. 50); Act of Nov. 19, 1919, ch. 112, 41 Stat. 356 (amending art.
112).

Summer 2022]

Federal Courts

581

rules.309 Further amendments were made in 1937 and 1942, and in 1947 they
were made applicable to the Air Force.310
With a significant number of civilians having been drafted into the military,
calls for further changes resulted the following year in passage of the Elston Act,
which, for the first time, authorized warrant officers and enlisted men to serve
as members of both general and special courts-martial when the accused was
enlisted.311 It strengthened the prohibitions on compulsory self-incrimination.312
In addition, it expanded the authority of the law member.313 The appellate
bodies, in turn, were provided with broader authority to examine evidence,
witnesses, and questions of fact.314
In 1950, largely in response to complaints from World War II servicemembers
who went on to serve in public office, Congress passed the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), a comprehensive list of criminal offenses under
military law and the operational rules that govern courts-martial. 315 The purpose
behind its adoption was to ensure a universal system for the armed forces,
applicable during peacetime and war.316 Over the ensuing years, Congress made
various amendments to the UCMJ, with the most sweeping changes following
comprehensive examination of the UCMJ by the Military Justice Review Group
2014–2015.317 In 2016, Congress modernized the definitions for offenses,
altered maximum penalties, created new offenses regarding computers and new
technologies, standardized courts-martial, and streamlined the post-trial
process.318

309. OFF. OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL xi (1920)
(manual taking effect on Feb. 4, 1921 to coincide with the effective date of the revised Articles of
War).
310. See Act of Aug. 20, 1937, ch. 716, 50 Stat. 724, 724 (amending arts. 50½, 70); Act of
Aug. 1, 1942, ch. 542, 56 Stat. 732, 732–33 (amending art. 50½); National Security Act of 1947,
ch. 343, §§ 207–208, 61 Stat. 495, 502–04 (establishing the Air Force).
311. Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 203, art. 4, 62 Stat. 604, 628.
312. § 214, art. 24, 62 Stat. at 631.
313. § 206, art. 8, 62 Stat. at 629. Following World War I, the role of the law member had
altered to ensure that the individual did not serve as both the prosecutor and advisor to the court.
314. See § 226, art. 50, 62 Stat. at 635–38.
315. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (1950) (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946a). One of the most significant changes was the shift in the role of the law
member from a voting member of the panel to that of a law officer, in which capacity the individual
served in a more judicial capacity. See JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., supra note 295, at 6.
316. See JUDGE ADVOC. GEN.’S SCH., supra note 295, at 9–10.
317. See Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000, 2894; David A.
Schlueter, Reforming Military Justice: An Analysis of the Military Justice Act of 2016, 49 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1 (2017) (appendix has chart of additions and changes to the UCMJ).
318. See 130 Stat. at 2894; See also 2018 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial,
United States, Exec. Order No. 13,825, 3 C.F.R. 325 (2019), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 801 (2018);
Legal Services: Military Justice, Army Regulation 27–10 (Nov. 20, 2020); see e.g., Implementation
of the Military Justice Act of 2016, Army Directive 2018-28 (Dec. 20, 2018).
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Courts-martial are not standing courts. Convening authorities constitute each
one on an individual basis to address specific allegations against particular
individuals.319 The system has evolved to be a bottoms-up process, with the
express intent of freeing it from unlawful influence from above. Thus, while
courts-martial technically may be convened by the President, the Secretary of
Defense, or the commander of a combatant command, in practice, they are
convened by the senior commander of an installation—typically a general or
flag officer.320 The members of courts-martial panels normally are of the same
rank or outrank the accused and are not “peers” in the sense of how that term
applies to civilian juries.321 Military judges are subject to the military chain of
command and do not have the protections of good behavior or compensation
provided to Article III courts.322 The military judge who presides over a general
or special court-martial is a commissioned officer as well as a member of the bar
of the highest court of a State, and whom the Judge Advocate General certifies
to qualify for duty.323
In 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that alleged offenses had to be connected to
the defendant’s military service to be considered within military jurisdiction;
however, in 1989 the Court reversed its earlier decision, making the UCMJ
broadly applicable.324 To prosecute alleged violations, there are three types of
courts-martial in each of the armed forces: general, special, and summary.325
The Manual for Courts-Martial establishes uniform rules of procedure that are
similar to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.326 Decisions are reviewable
by the relevant Court of Criminal Appeals, constituted by not less than three
appellate military judges.327 The Court has jurisdiction over cases carrying the
death penalty, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipmen,
319. 57 C.J.S. § 248 (Westlaw, through Mar. 2022 update).
320. 10 U.S.C. §§ 822–24.
321. See id. § 825(e)(1).
322. See id. § 826; Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1994). Although the U.S.
Courts-Martial, like the Military Courts of Appeals, are neither courts of record nor explicitly
established under Article I, the Supreme Court has stated that they are Article I courts. See Weiss,
510 U.S. at 166–68 (stating that the Military Courts of Criminal Appeals are Article I courts); id.
at 166–67 (stating that the U.S. Courts-Martial are Article I courts).
323. 10 U.S.C. § 826(b).
324. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 (1969); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S.
435, 436 (1987).
325. See 10 U.S.C. § 817 (jurisdiction in general); id. § 818 (general courts-martial); id. § 819
(special courts-martial); id. § 820 (summary courts-martial).
326. Rules for Courts-Martial, in MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES II-1 to II206 (2019 ed.). The MCM is reviewed annually. 32 C.F.R. § 152.1 (2019).
327. 10 U.S.C. §§ 862, 864, 866, 869; 32 C.F.R. § 150.1 (2019). See United States v. Denedo,
556 U.S. 904, 912 (2009) (stating that Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA)
and Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) are Article I tribunals). Previously called the
Military Courts of Review, in 1994 they were renamed to more clearly reflect the appellate judicial
role of the tribunals. S. REP. NO. 103-282, at 230 (1994); see H.R. REP. NO. 103-701, at 737 (1994)
(Conf. Rep.).
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dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one or more years;
confinement six months to two years directly appealed by the defendant; and
any case referred to the Court by the Judge Advocate General.328 There are
currently four such courts in operation: the Coast Guard, Air Force, NavyMarine Corps, and Army Courts of Criminal Appeals, each of which operates
under its own procedures.329
The final and highest court within the courts-martial structure is the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF).330 A court of record,
it has five civilian judges appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate, each serving fifteen-year terms.331 Judges are removable for
neglect of duty, misconduct, or physical or mental disability.332 The Court has
jurisdiction over cases in which the sentence as affirmed by any military Court
of Criminal Appeals extends to death, any cases reviewed by the Court of
Criminal Appeals which the Judge Advocate General orders sent to the Court,
and by granting of petitions after review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.333 It
maintains its own procedures,334 with its decisions reviewable by the Supreme
Court.335
2. Military Commissions: Article I, Section 8, Clauses 10 and 11
Unlike courts-martial, which are directed at ensuring discipline within the
military, military commissions apply to non-soldiers: i.e., enemy combatants
and civilians in times of war.336 Their purpose is to root out enemy spies,
saboteurs, and provocateurs.337 As a constitutional matter, commissions derive
from Congress’s authority “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”; and its
power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,

328. See 32 C.F.R. § 150.2; 10 U.S.C. §§ 866(b), 869(d).
329. 32 C.F.R. § 150.1. See, e.g., Courts of Criminal Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure,
32 C.F.R. pt. 150; Joint Rules of Appellate Procedures for Courts of Criminal Appeals; United
States Army Court of Criminal Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure; United States Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals Rules of Appellate Procedure; United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure; United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal
Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure.
330. 10 U.S.C. § 941; About the Court, U.S. Ct. App. for the Armed Forces,
https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/about.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
331. §§ 941, 942(a)–(b)
332. § 942(c).
333. § 867(a).
334. See United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Rules of Practice and Procedure.
335. 10 U.S.C. § 867a.
336. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
337. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30–31.
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and Offences against the Law of Nations.”338 They thus carry with them an
imprimateur of international law—particularly, provisions related to the laws of
war.
According to the Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin, the history of military
commissions dates back to the Revolutionary War, when General George
Washington constituted a military tribunal to try a British officer, Major John
André, for espionage.339 The head of Britain’s Secret Service in America, André
was caught while out of uniform, conspiring with Benedict Arnold.340 Military
commissions were regularly convened during the Mexican-American War and
Civil War.341 Similarly, military commissions were established during the
Indian Wars, Philippine Insurrection, World War II, and post-9/11 military
actions premised on the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force.342
In 1866, the Supreme Court determined that the use of military tribunals for
civilians, even during wartime, was unconstitutional as long as the civilian
courts were still in business.343 But where, as in Ex parte Quirin, Congress
explicitly sanctions the use of military commissions for offenses against the law
of war, they operate.344 Such was the determination of the Court again in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, when it ruled that neither the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force nor the Detainee Treatment Act expanded the President’s power
to convene military commissions.345 The Court’s approach underscores that the
authority to establish such courts relies not, narrowly, on Article II, but on
Congress’s Article I powers—demanding a statutory framing to meet

338. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 10.
339. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 & n.9 (citing Proceedings of a Board of General Officers
Respecting Major John André, Sept. 29, 1780 (Francis Bailey ed., Philadelphia 1780),
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N13491.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext; but see Glazier,
supra note 287, at 18–22 (arguing that the trial was an advisory opinion). Aside from André,
Washington also brought Thomas Shanks before a Board of General Officers to avoid a formal
trial. See id. at 22.
340. Glazier, supra note 287, at 18.
341. See, e.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 n.10 (citing WINTHROP, supra note 278, at 832 n.66
(detailing numerous military commissions established in the course of the Mexican War) James
Hamilton, Dep’t of the Ohio, Gen. Ord. No. 153 (Sept. 18, 1863) (trying soldiers and officers from
the Confederate Army for “being secretly within the lines of the United States forces”)); Dep’t of
the Pac., Gen. Ord. No. 52 (June 27, 1865) (detailing the trial of T.E. Hogg and others during the
Civil War by military commission for “violations of the laws and usages of civilized war”); Dep’t
of the E., Gen. Ord. No. 14 (Feb. 14, 1865) (trying John Y. Beall for violation of the laws of war).
See also Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
342. See, e.g., Glazier, supra note 287; Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: A Concise
History, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 35 (2007); Peter R. Mansoor, Guantanamo and the History of Military
Commissions, HOOVER INST. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/guantanamo-andhistory-military-commissions.
343. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
344. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28.
345. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94 (2006).
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Constitutional requirements. In acting upon such authorization, the President
further relies on Article II commander-in-chief authorities.346
Military commissions are constituted by military officers and follow a
different appellate structure than courts-martial. The currently-operable U.S.
Court of Military Commission Review is a court of record consisting of one or
more panels, each of which is composed of appellate military judges assigned
by the Secretary of Defense or appointed by the President, by and with the
consent of the Senate.347 The Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from any
military commission.348 It operates according to its own rules of procedure.349
Its decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia and, thence, to the Supreme Court.350
3. Veterans Affairs: Article I, Section 8, Clauses 14 and 16
The final military court in existence is the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, which, like courts-martial, is a federal court of record established
pursuant to Congress’s authority to make rules for the military. The court has
exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
relating to veterans’ claims regarding benefits for service-related disabilities,
survivor benefits, and other benefits owed to servicemembers (e.g., funding for
higher education, or waivers of debt).351 Its decisions, in turn, are reviewable by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.352 The court is composed of
at least three and not more than seven judges, appointed by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for terms of fifteen years.353
C. Federal Claims: Article I, Section 8, Clause 1
From the Founding of the United States until just before the Civil War,
Congress received and decided private claims against the United States through
its committee system and congressional entities, followed by private
appropriations bills subject to bicameralism and presentment.354 Addressing
346. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 2561, PUB. PAPERS 296 (July 7, 1942) (citing both statutory
law and the commander-in-chief provisions).
347. 10 U.S.C. § 950f (West); see also In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (stating
that the Military Commissions Act of 2009 established an Article I court of record). Note, however,
that the Court in Hamdan, discussing the interplay of Article I, Section 8, Clauses 10, 11, 12, and
14, and Article II did not definitively rule on whether the President could constitutionally convene
a military commission without sanction by Congress under the Commander-in-Chief authority,
augmented by the Law of War. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591.
348. 10 U.S.C. § 950c.
349. See United States Court of Military Commission Review Rules of Practice.
350. 10 U.S.C. § 950g(a), (e).
351. 38 U.S.C. § 7252.
352. Id. § 7292.
353. 38 U.S.C. § 7253; see also id. § 7251.
354. Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution
from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 643–45 (1985).
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such concerns was part and parcel of the political process. But the number of
petitions rapidly grew: by 1838, the volume had increased six-fold over those
presented to the First Congress, making it impossible to consider, much less
dispose of, most grievances.355 As one scholar opined, “[b]y 1848, the
dissatisfaction had turned to crisis. For the first time, the legitimacy of the
‘legislative model’ [of redressing grievances] came under widespread political
attack.”356 With only one out of every eighteen claimants petitions successfully
passing the House and Senate,357 the system was no longer merely expensive—
it was unjust.
Accordingly, in 1855, Congress created the Court of Claims to hear certain
matters, while still retaining control over both the expenditure of all public
money and the authority to continue to hear individual grievances.358 Its role
was to determine certain claims against the federal government as well as claims
referred by Congress.359 The statute required the court to report back to
Congress, which decided whether it would pay the recommended judgment out
of the public funds.360 Congress provided for the three jurists to be appointed
and to serve in office in a manner that echoed Article III: nomination by the
President, confirmation by the Senate, and tenure during good behavior.361 The
constitutional nexus for the creation of the tribunal was found in Congress’s
control over the power to pay the debts of the United States, as encapsulated in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, in concert with the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The structure failed to address the underlying problem. The number of
unaddressed grievances continued to increase.362 Further augmented by a flood
of Civil War claims, matters came to a head. In 1863, Congress therefore gave
the court the power to issue its own decisions, instead of merely reporting its
determinations to the legislature.363 The statute still required the Secretary of
the Treasury to review the decisions and to estimate the appropriation prior to
any disbursement of funds.364
Two years later, in Gordon v. United States, the Supreme Court refused
jurisdiction over appeals from the court.365 No formal opinion accompanied the
denial. Upon becoming Chief Justice, though, Salmon P. Chase published an
opinion attributing it to the provision according the Treasury the power of
355. See H.R. Rep. No. 25-730, at 4, 8–9 (1838).
356. Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution
from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 649 (1985).
357. Id. at 648–49 n.190.
358. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
359. Id. § 1, 10 Stat. at 612.
360. Id. § 7–9, 10 Stat. at 613–14.
361. Id. § 1, 10 Stat. at 612.
362. Shimomura, supra note 356, at 653.
363. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 91, § 3, 12 Stat. 765, 765.
364. Id. § 14, 12 Stat. at 768.
365. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864).
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review.366 It was within Congress’s power to establish an entity to examine
testimony and to determine the validity of claims. The problem was trying to
insert the Supreme Court into the process. The prospect of its opinions being
regulated by the executive or legislative branches raised separation of powers
concerns. In 1792, five of the six Supreme Court justices had rejected a similar
legislative structure in Hayburn’s Case—a point underscored the following year
in Chisolm v. Georgia, when it determined that the Court could hear claims
against states with their decision final (thus prompting the 11th Amendment).367
Within a year of the Court’s refusal of jurisdiction in Gordon v. United States,
Congress struck the offending provision from the statute.368 Thereafter, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals from the Court of Claims.369 In 1886, the
Court held that “as the law now stands, appeals do lie to this court from the
judgments of the Court of Claims in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.”370
In 1887, Congress passed legislation expanding the Court of Federal Claims’
jurisdiction to all claims except tort, and restricting what could go to Congress,
making the court the primary venue for monetary claims against the United
States.371
Throughout this time, the court operated as an Article I, Section 8 entity.372
In Williams v. United States, it noted that what started as an administrative or
advisory body had evolved into a court exercising judicial power and capable of
rendering final judgements reviewable by the Supreme Court.373 There was no
constitutional tension in maintaining two parallel systems, with final appeal
lodged in Article III: while Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 extends the judicial

366. Gordon v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 1 (1871). Twenty-one years after Chief Justice Taney’s
death, a draft opinion he wrote also emerged, linking the Court’s denial of jurisdiction to the
requirement that the Court’s ruling be final and enforceable. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.
697 (1864).
367. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.2 (1792) (five of the six Justices declining
to hear the claims and questioning the constitutionality of the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792, ch. 11,
1 Stat. 243, whereby disabled veterans could apply for pensions to the U.S. Circuit Courts, with
their decisions subject to a stay by the Secretary of War pending further Congressional action);
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that Art. III, Section 2 abrogated state
sovereign immunity and provided for the justiciability of suits between private citizens and states),
superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. While the latter case is most often understood as a matter
of state versus federal power, Federalists at the time were also concerned about its implications for
transferring the responsibility for the allocation of federal monies to the judiciary. See Shimomura,
supra note 356, at 642–43.
368. Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
369. See De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1866); United States v. Alire, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 577 (1867) (mem.); United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641 (1874);
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879).
370. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 480 (1886).
371. See Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
372. The Court would be declared an Article III court in 1953. Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253,
sec. 1, § 171, 67 Stat. 226, 226.
373. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 567–68, 581 (1933).
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power to “all” cases relating to certain areas, it omitted the word in regard to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party. This meant that cases
could start in Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 tribunals.
As Congress became more focused on matters of national and international
concern in the mid-20th century, the federal judiciary assumed the responsibility
of determining virtually all claims against the United States.374 Then, in 1953,
as discussed in Part II(B)(5), Congress declared the U.S. Court of Claims to be
an Article III court.375 Six years later, the Supreme Court confirmed the court’s
status.376 In 1982, however, Congress turned the tribunal back into an Article I
Court.377 Currently, it thus operates as an Article I court, subject to review in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (itself an Article III court).378
D. Taxes and Customs: Article I, Section 8, Clause 1
Other legislative courts stem from so-called public rights, such as those
related to taxes, customs, and administration of public lands. The public rights
distinction was first identified by the Supreme Court in 1855. The Court
explained,
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented
in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress
may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, as it may deem proper. Equitable claims to land by the
inhabitants of ceded territories form a striking instance of such a class
of cases.379
The U.S. Tax Court has nineteen members, appointed to fifteen-year terms by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.380 The court has limited
subject matter jurisdiction: it may only consider cases related to taxation.381

374. The Court of Claims does not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United
States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491(b)(1) (conferring concurrent jurisdiction on district courts
and the court of claims for certain actions).
375. Act of July 28, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83–158, 67 Stat. 226.
376. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569-71 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion).
377. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–164, sec. 105, § 171, 96 Stat.
25, 27 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 171).
378. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171(a), 1295(a)(3); see also Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102–572, § 902(a), 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (assigning the name “United States Court of
Federal Claims”).
379. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1856).
380. 26 U.S.C. § 7443.
381. See id. § 7442.
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E. Bankruptcy: Article I, Section 8, Clause 4
Although the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the authority to
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States,” for much of the country’s history, Congress did not vest federal courts
with jurisdiction over bankruptcy.382 Three short-lived statutes marked the 19th
century. In 1800, facing an economic downturn, Congress defined what would
constitute an act of bankruptcy and provided for district court judges to appoint
commissioners to oversee the discharge of debts in the course of bankruptcy
proceedings.383 Congress repealed the act in 1803.384 Nearly forty years later,
again facing an economic depression, Congress enacted a statute that was to last
only two years, during which time district courts held jurisdiction over “all
matters and proceedings in bankruptcy.”385 In 1867, Congress again waded into
the water, granting district courts original jurisdiction over bankruptcy,
abandoning the effort in 1878.386
It was not until 1898 that Congress was able to enact a lasting measure, at
which time it established referees, to be appointed by district judges, to oversee
bankruptcy cases and to exercise limited judicial responsibilities for matters
referred by the district court.387 Subsequent amendments expanded the power
accorded to the referees.388 As the district courts became increasingly
congested, as part of a broader reform effort, the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States, created by Congress,389 recommended that a separate
set of subject-specific federal courts be created.390 The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 gave original jurisdiction for bankruptcy to the district courts, creating
a separate, adjunct court in each judicial district to exercise the jurisdiction.391
The judges were to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
with a term of office set at fourteen years.392

382. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
383. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 1–2, 2 Stat. 19, 19–22.
384. Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the
1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 (1999) (positing that the enactment and repeal
of the 1800 act was in part due to a power struggle between Federalists and Jeffersonian
Democrats).
385. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 440, 445, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch.
82, 5 Stat. 614.
386. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517, 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch.
160, 20 Stat. 99.
387. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 33–34, 38–39, 30 Stat. 544, 555–56.
388. See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Act of June 28, 1946, ch. 512, sec. 2, §
34, 60 Stat. 323, 324.
389. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–354, 84 Stat. 468.
390. H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137, pt. 1, at 6 (1973).
391. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 201, 241, §§ 151, 1471, 92
Stat. 2549, 2657, 2668.
392. Id. sec. 201, §§ 152–153, 92 Stat. at 2657.
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In 1982, the Supreme Court declared the grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to
courts constituted by judges without life tenure to be unconstitutional.393
Congress responded by passing a new statute that conferred jurisdiction on the
district courts and authorizing them to refer all matters within that jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy judges for the district.394 The statute also changed the manner
of appointment, giving the Courts of Appeals the power to appoint judges.395
Additional amendments in 1986, 2004, and 2005 further shaped the
structure.396 Currently, bankruptcy courts exist as a unit of the district court in
which they reside.397 Judges are appointed by the courts of appeals of the circuit
in which they are located for a term of 14 years.398 Reflecting the need for a
dedicated court to relieve the district courts of the burden, there are currently
316 bankruptcy judges in the United States.399 The salary is set at ninety-two
percent of a district court judge.400 They can be removed “only for
incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability and
only by the judicial council of the circuit in which the judge’s official duty
station is located.”401 Each district court may provide that any or all cases under
Title 11 be assigned to a bankruptcy court.402
The decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy courts are reviewable by the U.S. district
courts or, where applicable, by a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.403 Such panels
are composed of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals.404 Their decisions are
reviewable by the relevant circuit court of appeals.405

393. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60–62, 87 (1982),
superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
394. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 98-353, sec. 104, § 157,
98 Stat. 333, 340 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 157).
395. Id. sec. 104, § 152, 98 Stat. at 336 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 152).
396. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-304,
108 Stat. 4106; Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
397. 28 U.S.C. § 151.
398. Id. § 152(a)(1).
399. See id. § 152(a)(2).
400. Id. § 153.
401. Id. § 152(e).
402. Id. § 157(a).
403. Id. § 158. Note that not all circuits have Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs). See Court
Insider: What Is a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 5, 2012) https://www.uscourts.gov/
news/2012/11/26/court-insider-what-bankruptcy-appellate-panel. The rules of the First Circuit,
Sixth Circuit, Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit panels differ.
404. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1).
405. Id. § 158(d).
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F. Citizenship: Article I, Section 8, Clause 4
The Choctaw and Chikasaw Citizenship Court, created by Congress in 1902,
also operated as an Article I court.406 It came out of a series of statutes passed
in the late 19th century that focused on dividing and allocating land among the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole nations.407 An act of
Congress in 1893 established a commission to negotiate the agreement.408
Named after its chair, Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts, the Commission
to the Five Civilized Tribes (Dawes Commission) accepted or rejected
applicants for membership in the tribes based on whether the tribal government
had previously acknowledged their membership.409 It distinguished among
applicants as citizens by blood, citizens by marriage, minor citizens by blood,
new born citizens by blood, freedmen (formerly enslaved African Americans)
new born freedmen, and minor freedmen.410
Those who were unsuccessful at obtaining citizenship could appeal to the U.S.
Court for the Indian Territory, which in some cases granted the appeal without
notice to the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations.411 The nations objected,
prompting Congress in 1902 to reach an accord with them whereby it created an
Article I court.412 The President appointed a chief judge and two associate
judges, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.413
The statute authorized the tribes to file a suit in this court, with ten named
defendants standing as those who had been admitted without notice.414 The law
granted the court appellate jurisdiction for citizenship determinations as reached
by the U.S. court in the Indian territory.415 The agreement also conferred
exclusive jurisdiction “upon the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes to
determine, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, all matters relating
to the allotment of land.”416 The court, by agreement, was to terminate upon a
final determination of the citizenship question, but no later than the end of
1903—a deadline that Congress subsequently extended to the end of the
406. Act of July 21, 1902, ch. 1362, § 33, 32 Stat. 641, 648.
407. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 412, 25 Stat. 980; Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat.
612; Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495; Act of May 31, 1900, ch. 598, 31 Stat. 221.
408. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. at 645.
409. Dawes Records: Five Civilized Tribes—Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and
Seminole Tribes in Oklahoma, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/
native-americans/dawes?_ga=2.11424372.1336762792.1603825750-746858546.1602531796 (last
visited Jan. 12, 2022).
410. Id.
411. Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, 1902-1904, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.
gov/history/courts/choctaw-and-chickasaw-citizenship-court-1902-1904 (last visited Jan. 20,
2022).
412. See Act of July 21, 1902, ch. 1362, § 33, 32 Stat. 641, 648.
413. Id.
414. Id. § 31, 32 Stat. at 646–47.
415. Id. § 32, 32 Stat. at 647.
416. Id. § 24, 32 Stat. at 644.
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following year.417 The court only operated less than seven months after reaching
a final determination in just one case.418
III. TERRITORIAL COURTS: ARTICLE IV, SECTION 3
In 1781, the Articles of Confederation gave the national government (in
Congress assembled) the power to determine admission to the union.419 Three
years later, the Treaty of Paris brought a formal end to the Revolutionary War,
ceding not just the thirteen colonies (at that point, nascent states), but most of
Britain’s possessions east of the Mississippi River.420 The Northwest
Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787 reconstituted this land as Northwest
Territory, provided for its governance, and outlined the process for state
admission.421 By the time the Constitution was adopted, it was thus clear that
explicit authority had to be provided to govern such territories. Accordingly,
Article IV, Section 3, gives Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States.”422
As a constitutional matter, therefore, Congress possesses and exercises
absolute control over U.S. territories.423 In 1828, the question of the status of
courts in the territories came before the Supreme Court. As Part III of this
Article noted, in this case Marshall pinpointed the constitutional locus as Article
IV, as well as the sovereign authority of the United States.424 Just over two
decades later, the Court again returned to the status of the governance structure
in the territories:
They are legislative governments, and their courts legislative courts,
Congress, in the exercise of its powers in the organization and
government of the Territories, combining the powers of both the
Federal and State authorities. There is but one system of government,
or of laws operating within their limits, as neither is subject to the
constitutional provisions in respect to State and Federal jurisdiction.
They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject to its
complex distribution of the powers of government, as the organic law;

417. Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court, supra note 411.
418. Id.
419. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XI (requiring the admission into the
Union be agreed to by nine states).
420. Definitive Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Paris), Gr. Brit.–U.S., art. II. Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat.
80, 81–82.
421. Eds. of Encyc. Britannica, Northwest Ordinances, BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.
com/place/Northwest-Territory (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
422. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
423. See Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336–37 (1810).
424. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
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but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative department, and
subject to its supervision and control.425
While it is true that Congress brings such entities into being, they are not Article
I courts in a constitutional sense.426
Failure to acknowledge this aspect of territorial government has led to much
confusion, not least in determining to what extent other Constitutional
provisions apply to the territories. In the Insular Tariff Cases that marked the
end of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court wrestled with how
to understand governance of noncontiguous territory.427 One of the most
prominent cases, Downes v. Bidwell, concluded that a tariff imposed on goods
imported from Puerto Rico did not violate Article I constitutional provisions
requiring uniform duties, imposts, and excises.428 Similarly, in Dooley v. United
States, the Court upheld the Foraker Act, requiring all merchandise to Puerto
Rico from the United States to carry a duty—despite the constitutional provision
in Article I forbidding any tax or duty on articles exported from any state.429 No
clear rationale dominated the Court’s determination. Gradually, through the
doctrine of territorial incorporation (which stemmed from Justice Edward
White’s concurrence in Downes), the application of Constitutional provisions
became understood in terms of whether the territories in question had become
“incorporated into the union.”430
In its exercise of its power over the myriad territories acquired by the United
States, Congress has created at least four dozen separate territorial judicial
systems. Every single one of the attendant courts is a non-Article III (and nonArticle I) entity.431 Consistent with the doctrine, we divide these tribunals into
two categories: incorporated and unincorporated territorial courts.

425. Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242 (1850).
426. When territorial courts are addressed in the scholarship, they are frequently (and
erroneously) described as Article I courts. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 9 at 55.
427. See e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & Puerto Rico Steamship
Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
428. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
429. Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 155–57 (1901); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 5.
430. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304 –05 (1922).
431. See, e.g., id.; Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336–37 (1810); Clinton v. Englebrecht,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 656 (1873);
Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); City
of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); McAllister v. United Sates, 141 U.S. 174, 183–84 (1891);
see also Romeu v. Todd, 206 U.S. 358, 368 (1907) (“The district court of the United States for
Porto Rico is in no sense a constitutional court of the United States, and its authority emanates
wholly from Congress under the sanction of the power possessed by that body to govern territory
occupying the relation to the United States which Porto Rico does.”).
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A. Incorporated Territories
Outside of the original thirteen states, as well as Kentucky, Vermont, Texas,
California, and West Virginia, every state in the continental U.S. came within
an incorporated territory prior to admission.432 In total, some thirty-one
territories (or parts thereof) eventually became states. In each case, Congress
created superior and inferior federal courts to execute territorial judicial power
and to administer the law.433 The federal legislature also determined which legal
system would be administered. Where Congress could not decide (for example,
whether English, Canadian, Spanish, or Mexican rules should apply), it provided
territorial courts with jurisdiction over “criminal” and “civil” cases and ensured
that the pre-existing law would remain in force, to the extent that it was
compatible with the U.S. Constitution.434 Where Congress intended for the
adoption of the English system of law, in some cases it explicitly provided for
superior judges to be granted common law jurisdiction.435 In others, it
established that inhabitants were “entitled” to judicial proceedings consistent
with common law.436 At times Congress gave superior judges both chancery
and common law jurisdiction.437 In one case (Alaska), Congress indicated that
432. William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Territorial Courts and Law: Unifying
Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions – Pt. II, 61 MICH. L. REV. 467, 467
(1963). In 1912 the last state in the continental United States was admitted to the Union. Id.
433. See, e.g., Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88. For an excellent
summary of courts established in the territories prior to 1836, see William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth
Gaspar Brown, Territorial Courts and Law: Unifying Factors in the Development of American
Legal Institutions – Pt. I, 61 MICH. L. REV. 39, 45–47 (1962).
434. Blume & Brown, supra note 432, at 518. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1805 ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat.
322, 322 (giving inhabitants of the Orleans Territory “all the rights, privileges, and advantages
secured by” the Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 743, 747
(guaranteeing that judicial proceedings in the Missouri Territory would be conducted “according
to the common law and the laws and usages in force in the said territory”).
435. See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (conferring common law
jurisdiction on the superior judges and ensuring that inhabitants should “always be entitled to the
benefits of . . . judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law”); Act of Apr. 7,
1798, ch. 28, § 6, 1 Stat. 549, 550 (guaranteeing the people of Mississippi “the rights, privileges
and advantages” granted by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2
Stat. 58, 59 (conferring common law jurisdiction on Indiana courts through incorporation of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of Jan. 11, 1805, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 309, 309 (conferring common
law jurisdiction on the Michigan Territory through incorporation by reference of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787).
436. See, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, art. 2, 1 Stat. 51, 52 (conferring common
law jurisdiction on the superior judges and ensuring that inhabitants should “always be entitled to
the benefits of . . . judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.”); Act of Apr.
20, 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 10, 15 (entitling inhabitants of the Wisconsin Territory benefits
granted and secured in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787); Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9
Stat. 323, 329 (entitling inhabitants of the Oregon Territory to the “rights, privileges, and
advantages granted and secured” by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787).
437. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 453, 455 (Utah); Act of Mar. 2, 1853,
ch. 90, § 9, 10 Stat. 172, 175–76 (Washington); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, §§ 9, 27, 10 Stat. 277,
280, 286 (Nebraska and Kansas); Act of Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 59, § 9, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (Colorado);
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“[t]he common law of England as adopted and understood in the United States”
would be in force.438
Despite such direction, considerable questions remained about what,
precisely, constituted common law—an issue addressed by subsequent territorial
case law and statutory provisions.439 Some looked to the common law of
England and statutes that supported it prior to 1607 (the rule of decision). Others
considered the law as it existed in 1776; still others looked to select British
statutes.440 In all cases, the laws and system of rules adopted had to be
compatible with the U.S. Constitution.441 Congress also granted territorial
courts jurisdiction over other matters, such as probate (wills and conveyances of
land); divorce; admiralty; and bankruptcy.442 The rules of procedure varied. In
1800, for instance, the General Assembly of Northwest required judges of the
General Court “to compile a system of rules for the government of the general
and circuit courts.”443 In other regions, the highest court in the territory
established the equivalent rules.444 Although the U.S. Supreme Court
determined in 1863 that a territorial court sitting in chancery was governed by
the same rules governing Article III entities, in 1874 the Court reversed
course.445
With the exception of some early judges, for whom Congress guaranteed
office during good behavior, territorial judges were appointed for limited terms
and removable by the President at will.446 For the territorial governments
Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 83, § 9, 12 Stat. 209, 212 (Nevada); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12
Stat. 239, 242 (Dakota); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 117, § 9, 12 Stat. 808, 811 (Idaho); Act of May
26, 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88 (Montana); Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 235, § 9, 15 Stat. 178,
181 (Wyoming); Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 9, 26 Stat. 81, 85 (Oklahoma).
438. Alaska Criminal Code, ch. 429, § 218, 30 Stat. 1253, 1285 (1899); see also Act of May
17, 1884, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 24, 25–26 (1884) (general laws of Oregon declared to be enforced
within the Alaska judicial district).
439. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 652, 656–57 (1873) (ruling on
the intermingling of legal and equitable remedies under common law). For a thoughtful discussion
of the integration of law into the territories, see William Wirt Blume, Legislation on the American
Frontier: Adoption of Laws by Governor and Judges—Northwest Territory 1788-1798; Indiana
Territory 1800-1804; Michigan Territory 1805-1823, 60 MICH. L. REV. 317 (1962).
440. See generally Blume & Brown, supra note 432, at 477–523; Blume, supra note 439, at
333–48.
441. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 2935, at 523 (1887); Alaska Civil Code, ch. 786, tit. III, §
367, 31 Stat. 321, 552 (1900); see also Blume & Brown, supra note 432, at 510, 514 (quoting the
aforementioned statutes).
442. Blume & Brown, supra note 433, at 59–71.
443. Blume & Brown, supra note 432, at 475 (quoting 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE
NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 307 (Chase ed. 1833)).
444. See id. (referencing A DIGEST OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN (Detroit, Sheldon & Reed 1821)).
445. Orchard v. Hughes, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 73, 77 (1863), overruled by Hornbuckle v. Toombs,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 652–53 (1873).
446. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 5, 2 Stat. 283, 284 (Orleans); Act of June 4,
1812, ch. 95, § 10, 2 Stat. 743, 746 (Missouri); Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 7, 3 Stat. 493, 495
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constructed along the lines of the Northwest Ordinance, at least three judges
appointed by the President constituted the highest court in each territory, with
jurisdiction over both state-type and federal-type cases.447 After 1836, Congress
largely standardized its approach.448 In cases concerning the United States, and
later, cases involving certain amounts, federal law provided for appeal to Article
III courts.449 The U.S. Supreme Court generally acted as the highest court of
appeal.450
Once statehood was achieved, territorial courts ceased operating and were
replaced by Article III entities. But as long as the territory itself was the
dominant government, there was no question: the courts did not constitute the
judicial branch of the federal government.451 One way, therefore, to think about
territorial courts collectively is as “coextensive with and correspondent to [the
jurisdiction] of the State courts”—i.e., an entirely “different jurisdiction from
that exercised by the Circuit and District Courts of the United States.”452 Since
1959, there have not been any incorporated or organized territories.453

(Arkansas); Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 13, § 8, 3 Stat. 654, 657 (Florida); Act of June 12, 1838, ch.
96, § 9, 5 Stat. 235, 237–38 (Iowa); Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 9, 9 Stat. 323, 326 (Oregon);
Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 121, § 9, 9 Stat. 403, 406 (Minnesota); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, § 10,
9 Stat. 446, 449 (New Mexico); Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 453, 455 (Utah); Act of
Mar. 2, 1853, ch. 90, § 9, 10 Stat. 172, 175 (Washington); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, § 9, 10
Stat. 277, 280 (Nebraska); Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, § 27, 10 Stat. 277, 286 (Kansas); Act of
Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 59, § 9, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (Colorado); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 83, § 9, 12 Stat.
209, 212 (Nevada); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12 Stat. 239, 241 (Dakota); Act of Feb. 24,
1863, ch. 56, § 2, 12 Stat. 664, 665 (Arizona); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 117, § 9, 12 Stat. 808, 811
(Idaho); Act of May 26, 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 85, 88 (Montana); Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 235,
§ 9, 15 Stat. 178, 180–81 (Wyoming); Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 9, 26 Stat. 81, 85 (Oklahoma).
See also McAllister v. United Sates, 141 U.S. 174, 185 nn.1–2 (1891) (citing to these acts); Blume
& Brown, supra note 432, at 468; Blume & Brown, supra note 433, at 47.
447. Blume & Brown, supra note 432, at 477.
448. See Blume & Brown, supra note 433, at 49–51.
449. Blume & Brown, supra note 432, at 477. There are no published reports of early territorial
cases. Id. at 477 n.70.
450. See, e.g., Orchard, 68 U.S. 73 (on appeal from the Territorial Court of Nebraska).
451. See, e.g., City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); McAllister v. United States, 141
U.S. 174, 184 (1891); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 447 (1871).
452. Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 656 (1873). See also Benner v. Porter,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 244 (1850).
453. There is currently one incorporated or unorganized territory: the Palmyra Atoll, a national
wildlife refuge of approximately fifty islands owned by the Nature Conservancy and administered
by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service. One of the largest marine conservation areas globally, the
archipelago features pristine coral reefs, thermal vents, and the Masked Booby. See Definitions of
Insular Area Political Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/
oia/islands/politicatypes (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (listed under definitions for incorporate territory
and Territory); Palmyra Atoll, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/
refuge/palmyra_atoll/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
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B. Unincorporated Territories
Unincorporated territories describe regions where the U.S. Constitution has
not been fully incorporated. While fundamental rights are guaranteed, other
provisions are inapplicable. The Panama Canal provides a special case in that
the tribunal established there grew out of a statutorily-based territorial
governance structure but was eventually incorporated into the Fifth Circuit. It
thus more closely resembles the current territorial courts in existence, of which
there are three.454
The Panama Canal Zone provided a home for one of the first unincorporated
territorial courts. The 1902 Spooner Act authorized the President to purchase
the rights and property of the (French) New Panama Canal Company and to
secure “perpetual control of a strip of land, the territory of the Republic of
Colombia, not less than six miles in width, extending from the Caribbean Sea to
the Pacific Ocean” and the right to build a canal and to maintain and operate the
Panama Railroad in perpetuity.455 Should Columbia not concede, the President
was to negotiate the same from Costa Rica and Nicaragua.456 The statute created
an Isthmian Canal Commission, with seven members appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate to govern the region and oversee
construction of the canal, “subject to the direction and control of the
President.”457 Although the Senate ratified the treaty, the Colombian congress
rejected it.458
When the Republic of Panama declared its independence in 1903, the U.S.
landed marines and informed Colombia that it would not allow for trade to be
jeopardized.459 It recognized the new government and drafted a new treaty
which, in return for guaranteeing Panama’s independence, conveyed a ten mile
wide zone to the sovereign control of the United States.460 It further granted a
monopoly in perpetuity for canals and railways across the territory.461 Both
governments ratified the agreement.462 General W. Davis, the first governor,
appointed a judge to exercise judicial authority.463
For its first decade or so, governance was under the direct control of the
President. In 1912, however, Congress assumed more direct control,
establishing civil government and directing that the current laws would remain
454. The District Courts of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and Virgin Islands are discussed
infra this section.
455. Panama Canal Act of 1902, ch. 1302, §§ 1–2, 32 Stat. 481, 481.
456. § 4, 32 Stat. at 482.
457. § 7, 32 Stat. at 483.
458. DAVID YANCEY THOMAS, A HISTORY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN NEWLY
ACQUIRED TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES 315 (1904).
459. Id. at 315–16.
460. Id. at 317.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id. at 317–18.
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in effect only until Congress should provide otherwise.464 It recognized “[t]he
existing courts established in the Canal Zone by Executive order” and continued
them in operation until the courts provided for in the statute were established.465
It also established a District Court for the Canal Zone, with decisions appealable
to the Fifth Circuit.466 In 1914, by authorities vested in this Act, President
Woodrow Wilson issued an Executive Order abolishing the prior structure and,
consistent with legislative provisions directed at wartime, placed the canal under
the control of the Secretary of War.467 Two months later, he issued a second
Executive Order formally establishing the U.S. District Court for the Canal
Zone.468 Replacing the Supreme Court of the Canal Zone, the District Court had
original and appellate jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters.469 In 1933,
the court transferred to the U.S. Department of Justice.470 The court thereafter
operated until the return of the zone to Panama in 1982.471
Cuba, the Philippines, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, and Palau provide further examples of former U.S.
territories that have since become independent. Currently, there are thirteen
insular (unincorporated) areas, only five of which (Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and American Samoa) are
inhabited, and only three of which have territorial courts.472
Guam, one of the Mariana Islands, was ceded by Spain to the United States in
1899.473 In 1950, Congress passed a statute giving the protectorate a significant
amount of local autonomy.474 The District Court of Guam has the same
jurisdiction of a regular federal District Court (including, but not limited to,
diversity jurisdiction), as well as that of a bankruptcy court.475 The District
464. Panama Canal Act 1912, ch. 390, § 2, 37 Stat. 560, 561.
465. Id.
466. §§ 8–9, 37 Stat. at 565–66.
467. Exec. Order No. 1885 (Jan. 27, 1914), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
executive-order-1885-establish-permanent-organization-for-the-operation-and-government-the.
468. Exec. Order No. 1898 (Mar. 12, 1914), https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Executive_
Order_1898.
469. Id.
470. Exec. Order No. 6166, § 6 (June 10, 1933), https://www.archives.gov/federalregister/codification/executive-order/06166.html (transferring the U.S. Court for China, the District
Court of the United States for the Panama Canal Zone, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands
to the Department of Justice).
471. Panama Canal Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-70, §§ 2101, 2201, 93 Stat. 452, 493; History–
Panama Canal Zone, U.S. MARSHALS SERV., https://www.usmarshals.gov//history/panama/
index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2022).
472. See Definitions of Insular Area Political Organizations, supra note 453; The Territories:
They Are Us, STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 2018, at 27.
473. Treaty of Paris, Spain-U.S., art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755; see also 48 U.S.C.
1421 (defining the territory of Guam).
474. See Organic Act of Guam, ch. 512, § 11, 64 Stat. 384, 387 (1950) (codified as amended
at 48 U.S.C. § 1423a) (extending authority “to all subjects of legislation of local application”).
475. 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (related diversity jurisdiction provisions).
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Court of Guam has original jurisdiction in all other causes in Guam to the extent
that the legislature has not vested it in another court.476 Decisions are reviewable
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.477 Judges, appointed by the President to
ten year terms, are removable for cause and accorded a salary commensurate
with that of a district court judge.478 The court supplements the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure with Civil Local Rules of Practice (CVLR).
The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands is part of the same judicial
circuit as Guam.479 Granted a similar scope for its jurisdiction, the court is made
up of just one judge, appointed by the President for a ten-year term.480 Like the
District Court of Guam, appeal is to the Ninth Circuit.481 Both the Chief Judge
of the Ninth Circuit and the Chief Justice may assign additional, temporary
judges to the court.482
Congress similarly vested the judicial power of the Virgin Islands in a district
court and such appellate and lower courts as are created by local law.483 The
local legislature has the authority to grant them jurisdiction over any matters in
which the federal courts lack exclusive jurisdiction.484 Congress explicitly
provided the court with diversity jurisdiction as well as that of a bankruptcy
court in the United States, and exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal and civil
proceedings in the Virgin Islands in regard to the applicable income tax laws.485
The district court has concurrent jurisdiction with local courts over criminal
offenses.486 Its decisions are reviewable by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.487 The President appoints two judges to the court for ten year
terms, the longer serving of whom serves as chief judge of the court.488 The
salary rate is set to that of a district court judge.489 In the event that the case load
476. 48 U.S.C. § 1424(c). Congress also designated a local appellate court, the Supreme Court
of Guam, and trial court, the Superior Court of Guam. Id. § 1424(a)(1). The Supreme Court of
Guam has the power to create divisions of the Superior Court of Guam as well as other local courts.
Id. § 1424(a)(2)–(3).
477. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294(4); see also 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3 (appeal from the appellate
division).
478. 48 U.S.C. § 1424b(a).
479. Id. § 1821(a).
480. Id. §§ 1821(b)(1), 1822.
481. Id. § 1801 note (indicating that the Act of Mar. 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 403(b),
90 Stat. 263, 267 provides that portions of Title 28 that apply to the District Court of Guam are
applicable to the District Court for the Mariana Islands); see also id. § 1823 (appeal from the
appellate division).
482. Id. § 1821(b)(2).
483. Id. § 1611(a).
484. Id. § 1611(b).
485. Id. § 1612(a).
486. Id. § 1612(c).
487. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294(3); see also 48 U.S.C. § 1613a (appeal from the appellate
division).
488. 48 U.S.C. § 1614(a).
489. Id.
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becomes untenable, the chief judge of the Third Judicial Circuit may assign a
circuit judge or a recalled senior judge from the islands to temporarily serve on
the court.490
Although Congress previously created a territorial court for Puerto Rico, its
status has now shifted to that of an Article III entity. In its initial design, the
court had one judge in office for a four-year term.491 In 1915, Congress provided
for appeals from the court to go to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.492
Nevertheless, as recognized by the Supreme Court shortly thereafter, the Court
continued to function in its Article IV status
created by virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under
Article IV, § 3 [of the Constitution], of making all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States.
The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts
in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not
subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere
territorial court.493
In 1938, Congress doubled judges’ tenure on the court to eight years.494 In 1966,
Congress re-constituted it as a full Article III entity, with now seven judges
granted life tenure during good behavior.495
The final unincorporated inhabited territory, American Samoa, does not have
a federal court. Matters related to federal law instead go to U.S. district courts
in Hawaii or the District of Columbia.496
IV. TREATY-BASED COURTS: ARTICLES II, SECTION 2/I, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 3
HYBRIDS
Another category of federal court finds its origins in Article II, which grants
the executive the authority “to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur” and to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls.”497 The power to negotiate is construed broadly and reflects longestablished diplomatic practice—including providing for the establishment of
490. Id.
491. Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77, 84.
492. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, sec. 1–2, §§ 116(1), 128, 38 Stat. 803, 803.
493. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
494. Act of Mar. 26, 1938, ch. 51, sec. 1, § 42, 52 Stat. 118, 118.
495. Act of Sept. 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764 (providing judges with lifetime
tenure, thus reconstituting the court as an Article III District Court). For the statutes establishing
the judgeships, see § 34, 31 Stat. at 84 (creating one judgeship); Act of May 19, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-36, § 2(a), 75 Stat. 80, 81 (adding one judgeship); Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-272,
§1(a), 84 Stat. 294, 294 (adding one judgeship); Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 1(a),
92 Stat. 1629, 1629-30 (adding four judgeships); see also 28 U.S.C. § 133(a).
496. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-1124T, AMERICAN SAMOA: ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH SOME FEDERAL COURT OPTIONS 2 (2008).
497. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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federal courts overseas.498 As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he treatymaking power vested in our government extends to all proper subjects of
negotiation with foreign governments. It can, equally with any of the former or
present governments of Europe, make treaties providing for the exercise of
judicial authority in other countries by its officers appointed to reside therein.”499
Accordingly, citizens’ rights overseas, and the extent to which foreign nationals’
domestic law is applied through such courts, are set by formal international
agreement. So, too, are tribunals related to citizens’ rights outside the United
States when set against those of other countries.
Treaties are necessary but not sufficient for establishing extraterritorial courts.
They depend equally upon foreign nationals’ domestic law for the relevant
tribunal to be brought into existence.500 In the U.S. context, all such treaties
would have to be supported by Congressional statute.501 While the status of selfexecuting versus non-self-executing treaties is a complex area of the law, a
central consideration is whether Congress needs to create legal authority for
carrying out the functions and obligations in the agreement or making them
enforceable in a U.S. court.502 Consular courts, as well as tribunals related to
slavery and international land claims, fall within this category.
A. Consular Courts
From the earliest days of the Republic, it has been understood that when a
treaty addresses an area constitutionally assigned to Congress, it cannot be
used to bypass the legislature.503 Thus, lower courts have found that treaty
provisions which implicate revenue or expenditures require legislative action
to be given effect.504 In 1929, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress, in
creating consular courts, was acting under its commerce clause authorities.505
It had done so since the early days of the Republic.

498. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1891).
499. Id.
500. See Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13, 15–16 (1875).
501. In the case of the International Court of Justice, for instance, the Supreme Court
determined that the executive could not unilaterally enforce its decisions. Medellín v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 525–30 (2008).
502. See id. at 530.
503. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 771 (1796).
504. See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam); The Over
the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D. Conn. 1925); Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019, 1022
(D. Colo. 1983).
505. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929). Several courts have recognized
consular court jurisdiction and appellate review as designated by statute. See, e.g., Am. China Dev.
Co. v. Boyd, 148 F. 258 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1906); Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759 (9th Cir.
1907); Cunningham v. Rodgers, 171 F. 835 (9th Cir. 1909); Swayne & Hoyt, Inc. v. Everett, 255
F. 71 (9th Cir. 1919); Fleming v. United States, 279 F. 613 (9th Cir. 1922); Wulfsohn v. RussoAsiatic Bank, 11 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1926). There also may be an Article I(8)(18) claim here,
consistent with Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (holding that where a treaty was
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In 1792, for instance, the Second Congress passed a statute consistent with a
treaty between the United States and France, giving U.S. district court judges
the authority to hear cases related to shipwrecked French vessels off the coast of
the United States.506 U.S. consuls and vice-consuls overseas were given the right
of receiving any protests or declarations of captains, masters, crews, passengers,
and merchants (as were U.S. citizens) abroad, as well as any claims from foreign
persons against U.S. citizens.507 Consuls could issue decrees carrying the force
of law, as would such decisions “in all courts in the United States.”508 They
could manage the estates of U.S. persons who died either at sea or within their
consulate.509 For their work, consuls were to be paid according to a set rate of
compensation.510 These duties were “not be construed to the exclusion of others
resulting from the nature of their appointments, or any treaty or convention
under which they may act.”511 In 1803 and 1840, Congress passed two more
statutes, detailing further powers and responsibilities.512
The system continued to develop in piecemeal fashion, with the President
making consular appointments in an ad hoc manner. The number of consulates
rapidly proliferated: by 1846, there were 175 consulates and commercial
agencies abroad, plus three consuls to the Barbary States (in Tangiers, Tunis,
and Tripoli).513 These officers tended to operate in a manner that furthered the
personal interests of those in office, rather than those of the United States.514 In
light of the sheer numbers, the annual expenditures, and the lack of respect
afforded by other countries to the consuls’ positions, James Buchanan, U.S.
Secretary of State, called on Congress to reform the system.515
In 1848, Congress thus passed a fourth statute, setting out in a detailed and
comprehensive manner, the responsibilities and judicial functions of foreign
ministers and consuls.516 Again at the urging of the U.S. Secretary of State, just
over a decade later, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations considered a

constitutional, Congress had the power under Art. I(8)(18) to enact implementing legislation
without being constrained by the 10th Amendment).
506. Act of Apr. 14, 1792, ch. 24, § 1, 1 Stat. 254, 254. In Moore’s early 20th century account
of consular law, he erroneously asserts that the first law governing consuls came in 1848. See 2
JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 613 (1906). There were, however, prior
to that time, two statutes passed that related to consular affairs. See 1 Stat. 254; Act of Feb. 28,
1803, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 203; Act of July 20, 1840, ch. 48, 5 Stat. 394.
507. Sec. 2, 1 Stat. at 255.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. §§ 2, 4, 5, 1 Stat. at 255, 255–56.
511. Id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 257.
512. Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 203; Act of July 20, 1840, ch. 48, 5 Stat. 394.
513. H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 29-12 (2d Sess.), at 12 (1846).
514. See id. at 2–3.
515. See id. at 2–19.
516. Act of Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 150, 9 Stat. 276.
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new bill to carry certain aspects of treaties with several countries into effect.517
In 1866, Congress adopted a broader statute encompassing more States, which
was further amended in 1870, 1874, and 1876.518 These laws enabled U.S.
consuls in China, Japan, Siam, Egypt, Madagascar, Turkey, Abyssinia, Persia,
Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Muscat, the Samoan Islands, and other countries with
similar treaties in place to assume judicial functions.519
In 1832, for example, a treaty between the United States and the Ottoman
Empire provided,
If litigations and disputes should arise between the subjects of the
Sublime Porte and citizens of the United States, the parties shall not
be heard, nor shall judgment be pronounced unless the American
Dragoman be present. Causes in which the sum may exceed five
hundred piastres, shall be submitted to the Sublime Porte, to be
decided according to the laws of equity and justice. Citizens of the
United States of America, quietly pursuing their commerce, and not
being charged or convicted of any crime or offence, shall not be
molested; and even when they have committed some offence . . . they
shall be tried by their Minister or Consul, and punished according to
their offence.”520
Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the treaty, along with custom
and usage under the capitulatory regime in Egypt and in the former Ottoman
Empire, and “the laws of the United States enacted to give effect to the treaties
of the United States by virtue of which the United States was granted
extraterritorial jurisdiction,” formed the basis for subsequent American consular
courts in Egypt.521
Under the relevant statutes establishing consular courts, ministers and consuls
were provided with judicial authority,522 which extended in criminal matters to
trying and punishing citizens accused of offenses against U.S. law,523 and for
civil matters, to “all controversies between citizens of the United States, or
517. See Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72.
518. See Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, § 11, 14 Stat. 310, 322 (Egypt); Act of July 1, 1870,
ch. 194, § 1, 16 Stat. 183, 183 (Madagascar); Act of Mar. 23, 1874, ch. 62, 18 Stat. 23; Act of Feb.
1, 1876, ch. 6, 19 Stat. 2.
519. See 47 Rev. Stat. §§ 4083, 4125–4127 (2d ed. 1878); Act of June 14, 1878, ch. 193, 20
Stat. 131; see also 22 U.S.C. § 141 (1952), repealed by Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 773)
(removing consular jurisdiction from Morocco, the last foreign country where consuls exercised
such).
520. Treaty with the Ottoman Porte, Ottoman Empire–U.S., art. IV, May 7, 1830, 8 Stat. 408,
409.
521. See Letter from Green H. Hackworth, Legal Advisor, Sec’y of State, to Messrs. Alexander
and Green of New York (Aug. 26, 1935), reprinted in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1935, at 565 (E.R. Perkins & Gustave A. Nuermberger eds., 1953),
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1935v01/d432.
522. See 47 Rev. Stat. § 4083 (2d. ed. 1878); 22 U.S.C. §§ 141–183 (1952).
523. 47 Rev. Stat. § 4084 see also 22 U.S.C. § 142 (1952).
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others” insofar as is limited by the language of the governing treaty.524
Jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with U.S. law, or, where unsuitable or
deficient, with “the common law, and the law of equity and admiralty.”525 With
the exception of the U.S. Court of China (discussed below), the judges did not
enjoy tenure in office. If insufficient, ministers could make decrees or
regulations with the force of law, with the consuls signifying their agreement or
disagreement with the regulations in writing. Statutory law empowered the
minister to publish the regulation, along with advice received, and to transmit
the regulation to the Secretary of State “to be laid before Congress for
revision.”526
Like Article III courts, all consular courts have been courts of limited
jurisdiction.527 They are limited to consular business inside their district.528
Traditionally, their functions have included legalizing acts of foreign judicial or
other functionaries; authenticating citizens’ marriages, births, and deaths while
outside the United States; reclaiming deserters and providing for destitute
sailors; receiving protests of masters of vessels; and administering the personal
property of deceased citizens.529 For serious or complex matters carrying fines
above $500 or terms of imprisonment above sixty days, the consul must summon
up to four citizens to participate in the adjudicatory process.530 The judicial
authority provided to consuls and ministers has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court.531
At times, Congress has acted to put consular courts on a more robust
constitutional footing, building appeal into the Article III judicial branch. The
U.S. Court for China, for instance, served as a District Court with extraterritorial
jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in China. It arose out of the Treaty of Wangxia,
a diplomatic agreement between the Qing dynasty and the United States in 1844,
which established that U.S. citizens in China were exempt from the authority of
local courts and subject, instead, to U.S. law.532 In 1860, Congress passed
another statute to carry into effect a new treaty signed with China in 1858, as
well as similar treaties made with Japan, Siam, Persia, and elsewhere.533 These
agreements essentially formed the basis of a consular court for U.S. persons
located in China.

524. 47 Rev. Stat. § 4085; see also 22 U.S.C. § 143 (1952).
525. 47 Rev. Stat. § 4086; see also 22 U.S.C. § 145 (1952).
526. 47 Rev. Stat. §§ 4117–4119.
527. MOORE, supra note 506, at 628.
528. See id. at 616 (citing to 47 Rev. Stat. 4088).
529. Hajime Oura, Consular Courts 1–2 (1893) (Thesis, Cornell University School of Law),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1296&context=historical_theses.
530. See 47 Rev. Stat. § 4105–4107.
531. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464–65 (1891); Dainese v. Hale, 91 U.S. 13, 20 (1875).
532. See Treaty of Wangxia, China–U.S., art. XXI, July 3, 1844, 8 Stat. 592, 597.
533. See Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72.
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The court operated under U.S. law and adjudicated associated matters. But,
following numerous complaints, in 1906 Congress created the United States
Court for China.534 It extended jurisdiction to all criminal cases carrying a
punishment in excess of $100 fine or sixty days’ imprisonment, and civil cases
involving claims of more than $500.535 The court served as the appellate court
for the remaining consular cases and could also hear appeals from the consular
court in Korea.536 Appeal from the court was first to the Ninth Circuit (District
Court and then to the Circuit Court), and thence to the Supreme Court.537
The jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of China, both original and on appeal, in
civil and criminal matters, was to “in all cases be exercised in conformity with
said treaties and the laws of the United States.”538 Where deficient, “common
law and the law as established by the decisions of the courts of the United States”
applied.539 The judges of the court and the district attorney were appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with a fixed
compensation set by statute.540 The tenure of office was for ten years, with
removal prior to that time by the President for cause.541 The structure of the
court reflected that of an ordinary District Court, replete with a Presidentiallyappointed District Attorney, Marshal, and Clerk.542 The court was based in
Shanghai and had sessions in Canton, Tientsin, and Hankau.543
Along with the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium,
Switzerland, Norway, Brazil, Denmark, and Sweden held extraterritorial rights
in China.544 Only the United States and Great Britain, however, had
independent, autonomous courts.545 In every case, the threshold question for
judicial proceedings was the citizenship of the defendant, for while any plaintiff
could raise an issue, as long as the defendant was a national of the country in
question, they had the right to proceedings in their own consular court.546 In

534. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814, repealed by Treaty Between the United
States and the Republic of China for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the
Regulation of Related Matters, China–U.S., Jan. 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 767.
535. See id. §§ 1–2, 34 Stat. at 814.
536. § 2, 34 Stat. at 814–15.
537. § 3, 34 Stat. at 815.
538. § 4, 34 Stat. at 815.
539. Id.
540. Id. § 6, 34 Stat. at 816.
541. Id. § 7, 34 Stat. at 816.
542. Id. § 6, 34 Stat. at 816.
543. Id. § 1, 34 Stat. at 814.
544. Milton J. Helmick, United States Court for China, 14 FAR E. SURV. 252, 252 (1945).
545. Id.
546. See, e.g., Wulfsohn v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 11 F.2d 715, 717–18 (9th Cir. 1926); Husar
v. United States, 26 F.2d 847, 849–51 (9th Cir. 1928).
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1921, the court ruled that the U.S. Constitution did not apply in China.547 As a
practical matter, this meant no trial by jury, although, according to a judge on
the court, “the Bill of Rights was otherwise scrupulously respected as a matter
of primary American principle and legal policy.”548
The act creating the United States Court of China was not without its critics—
including the Secretary of State Elihu Root, who roundly denounced it.549 Not
least among the concerns was the difficulty of determining what constituted the
“laws of the United States,” as referenced in the governing statutes.550 Congress,
moreover, provided the tribunal with jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction
had previously been exercised by consuls and ministers.551 Where consular
legislation fell short, the court was to look to “the common law as established
by the decisions of the courts of the United States.”552 With forty-five sovereign
states at the time, plus some territories, it was difficult to say precisely what this
meant, and it mattered: most of the court’s proceedings focused on criminal
matters, issues related to commerce, or decedents’ estates—issues largely
addressed at a state level.553 In 1907, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals looked
to both the District of Columbia and to Alaska, as well as to 30 Geo. 2 c. 24
(1757)—which was entered into common law before the United States even
became a country—to reach a conclusion.554 According to Milton J. Helmick,
who served as a judge from 1934–43, the court subsequently “toyed for a time
with the Alaska Code” before deciding to ground its jurisprudence in the laws
adopted by the District of Columbia.555
During the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, Japan invaded and
occupied Shanghai.556 Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the U.S.
declared war on Japan, prompting the latter to end concessions for Americans in
Shanghai and to imprison the judges of the court.557 In 1943, the United States
signed a treaty with China that gave up any extraterritorial rights and abolished

547. See United States v. Furbush, 2 Extraterr. Cas. 73, 82-85 (U.S. Ct. China 1921) (citing
and quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891)) (“The Constitution can have no operation in
another country.”)
548. Helmick, supra note 544, at 254.
549. Id. at 253.
550. See, Note, United States Court for China, 49 HARV. L. REV. 793, 794 (1936).
551. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 1, 34 Stat. 814, 814.
552. Id. § 4, 34 Stat. at 815.
553. United State Courts for China, supra note 550, at 794.
554. See Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759, 761–63 (9th Cir. 1907).
555. Helmick, supra note 544, at 253.
556. See, e.g., Eds. of Encyc. Britannica, Second Sino-Japanese War: 1937-1945, BRITANNICA
(Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Second-Sino-Japanese-War.
557. U.S. Officials Kept in Hotel, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1941).
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the court.558 Five years later, Congress formally repealed the statutory
provisions.559
The U.S. Court for China provides special study in consular courts, as it is the
only one for whom appeal has been directly to an Article III court and whose
judges have enjoyed fixed terms (as aforementioned, ten years). In 1956,
Congress repealed its final remaining extraterritorial privilege (in Morocco),
thus ending the operation of federal consular courts.560
B. Slavery and Land Claims
In addition to the traditional consular courts, Congress has established other
courts to implement treaty arrangements. In 1862, for example, the United
States and Great Britain agreed to take mutual steps to suppress the slave
trade.561 Once again, Congress’s power to legislate arose from Art. I, Section 8,
Clause 3. The countries agreed that if either country discovered a ship of the
other country carrying slaves on the high seas, the cargo would be subject to
forfeiture proceeds before mixed claims courts, which would be established by
the two countries.562 There was no appeal from these courts.563 The court was
abolished in 1870.564
Pari passu, following the Mexican-American War, the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo required that the United States would respect land ownership rights
established by the Mexican government.565 During ratification, the Senate
struck the provisions; however, the United States assured Mexico that the land
rights would be respected.566 Following the failure of a number of land
commissions established to survey the newly-acquired territory, in 1891

558. See, e.g., Treaty for Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation
of Related Matters, China–U.S., Jan. 11, 1943, 57 Stat. 767.
559. See Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 869, 992 (1948). For further
discussion of the U.S. Court for China, see Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the
Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217
(2008).
560. Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 807, 70 Stat. 773.
561. Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade (Treaty of Washington), Gr. Brit.–
U.S., art. IV, Apr. 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 1225, 1227 (amended by Additional Article to the Treaty for
Suppression of the African Slave Trade, Gr. Brit.–U.S., Feb. 17, 1863, 13 Stat. 645); Act of July
11, 1862, ch. 140, 12 Stat. 531 (authorizing the President to nominate a judge to the court).
562. Art. IV, 12 Stat. at 1227.
563. Id.
564. See Additional Convention to Convention Respecting the African Slave Trade, Gr. Brit.–
U.S., June 3, 1870, 16 Stat. 777.
565. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo), Mex.–U.S., arts. VIII-X,
Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 929-30. See also Treaty of Mexico City, Mex.–U.S., art. V, Dec. 30,
1853, 10 Stat. 1031, 1035.
566. Court of Private Land Claims, 1891-1904, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/courts/court-private-land-claims-1891-1904 (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
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Congress created the Court of Private Land Claims.567 Five judges, appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, held five year terms,
with appeal from the court directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although it was
originally designed to complete its task in five years, the Court of Private Land
Claims continued for thirteen years, in the course of which it ruled on title to
more than 35 million acres of land.568
V. COURTS OF OCCUPATION: ARTICLE II, SECTION 1
Like the courts addressed in Parts II-V, above, Article II courts derive from
the Constitution. But unlike Article III, Section 1, Article I, Section 8, and
Article IV, Section 3 entities, or Article II, Section 2/Article I, Section 8, Clause
3 hybrids, pure Article II, Section 1 courts of occupation do not require
Congressional action prior to being brought into being. They are created solely
at the behest of the Executive. Driven by duties entrusted to commissioned
officers, they adhere to the Executive as an aspect of conquest and expansion.
They are unique to (1) land purchases prior to Congressional establishment of
territorial government, (2) armed rebellion, and (3) war with foreign powers.
As a matter of Constitutional grounding, Article II, Section 1, which
establishes the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
provides the primary locus.569 To some extent, the authority for their creation
can also be said to adhere to the executive by nature of the sovereignty of the
United States: occupation courts may be integral to national integrity or to U.S.
efforts to treat or to prosecute war with foreign powers.570 Over the course of
U.S. history, at least a dozen such entities have been established, generally—but
not solely—in the shadow of war.571 While most pre-date the Civil War, at least
four operated in the 20th century.572 In addition to the more established
occupation courts, numerous additional Article II, Section 1 tribunals operated
during the U.S. Civil War on an informal basis, with little or no record of their
proceedings.573 Some are referred to as “provost courts,” because provost
marshals, who handle law enforcement matters within the military, serve as
judges.574 Others are created, and jurists appointed, at the direction of the
individual responsible for governance of the region. Yet others are a form of

567. Act of Mar. 8, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854, 854–55. See also Wilber Griffith Katz, Federal
Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 907–08 (1930).
568. Court of Private Land Claims, 1891-1904, supra note 566.
569. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
570. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
571. See THOMAS, supra note 458, at 38–39, 63, 103–05, 230–31, 281, 282, 296–98, 303, 304,
312–13, and 317–18.
572. Bederman, supra note 8, at 826.
573. See, e.g., id. at 839–40; 2 FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA,
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD 238–39 (New Orleans, A.T. Penniman, & Co. 1829).
574. Bederman, supra note 8, at 840.
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military commission that do not rely on any, specific Congressional statute for
their operation.
A. Land Acquisition
As an historical matter, some occupation courts have been created as an
interim step, prior to Congressional establishment of territorial government. For
example, following the retrocession of what was to become the Louisiana
territory from Spain to France, and Napoleon Bonaparte’s accession, President
Thomas Jefferson used the impending war between Great Britain and France to
negotiate the transfer of the French land in North America to the United
States.575 As part of the Louisiana Purchase, the offices of alcaldes, who served
as judges in criminal cases in Spanish audiencias, were abolished, leaving no
one vested with judicial authority.576 Accordingly, one of Governor William
Claiborne’s first actions in New-Orleans was to create a court of pleas,
consisting of seven jurists with jurisdiction over certain civil and criminal
matters.577 The court could hear civil cases up to $3,000, with appeal for
anything over $500 directly to the governor.578 For criminal matters, the court
had jurisdiction over all offenses for which the punishment did not exceed sixty
days’ imprisonment and a fine of $200.579 Anything less than $100 could be
decided by an individual jurist, with appeal to the court of pleas.580
B. Armed Rebellion
Article II, Section 1 courts also have been established in regions marked by
violent civil unrest and armed rebellion, with examples present both early on in
U.S. history as well as during the Civil War. While the courts established during
the latter period bear many hallmarks of military commissions in that they are
constituted by the military and try civilian violations of law, they can be
distinguished from Article I, Section 8, Clauses 10 and 11 entities as a matter of
process and substance. First, unlike the case with military commissions, there
is no explicit Congressional authorization for their creation. Instead, they are
informally created—and disbanded—at the will of military commanders.
Second, unlike military commissions, no declaration of war undergirds their
formation. Third, they introduce laws and rules outside of any action by a
legislature that represents those to whom the laws apply. Fourth, they purport
to govern people within their locality—that is, their jurisdiction extends to both
military personnel and civilians within a specified area.
575. The Louisiana Purchase: Jefferson’s Constitutional Gamble, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Oct.
20, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-louisiana-purchase-jeffersons-constitutionalgamble.
576. See MARTIN, supra 573, at 239.
577. Id. at 237–39.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 239.
580. Id.
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Such courts have operated from the earliest days of the Republic. Recall that
during the Revolutionary War the colonies of East and West Florida stayed loyal
to the Crown.581 The 1783 Treaty of Paris returned them to Spain.582 In 1810,
the settlers in West Florida rebelled and declared independence.583 President
James Madison asserted that the portions of West Florida from the Mississippi
to the Perdido rivers had been acquired as part of the Louisiana Purchase, and
negotiations commenced with Spain.584
In Spanish-controlled Florida, the pretext of Seminole attacks within U.S.
territories in late 1817 and 1818 led to the creation of occupation courts.585 In
January 1818, Major James Bankhead, the commanding officer in Fernandina
(located on Amelia Island—and now the northernmost city on the coast of
Florida), issued an ordinance applying U.S. law and installing two justices of the
peace, to issue final decisions in cases involving claims up to one hundred
dollars.586 The justices were to investigate criminal cases and to forward their
opinions to the commanding officer, who had final authority in cases affecting
the life of the accused.587 To the commanding officer fell “all cases of riot, or
other disorders that may affect the peace and security” of the island.588 As a
matter of procedure, “[i]n all cases, particularly in matters of evidence, the
usages and customs of the United States” applied.589 At that point, conditions
of war and unrest existed in the territory, prompting John C. Calhoun, Secretary
of War, to support stringent measures.590 Simultaneously, General Andrew
Jackson pushed for U.S. invasion and control of Pensacola—a goal
accomplished in May 1818.591 Following conquest, in February 1819, Spain

581. Acquisition of Florida: Treaty of Adams-Onis (1819) and Transcontinental Treaty (1821),
OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/florida (last visited Jan. 7,
2021).
582. Id.; Definitive Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Paris), Gr. Brit.–U.S., art. II. Sept. 3, 1783, 8
Stat. 80, 81–82.
583. Acquisition of Florida, supra note 581.
584. Id.
585. THOMAS, supra note 458, at 59–62.
586. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTING INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE
OCCUPANCY OF AMELIA ISLAND, ST. MARKS, AND PENSACOLA, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 15-117, 9–
10 (2d Sess., 1819) (extract of a letter from Major James Bankhead to J.C. Calhoun, Sec’y of War,
Jan. 10, 1818) (ordinance issued Jan. 5, 1818).
587. Id. at 10.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. See, e.g., id. at 11–17 (detailing armed conflict).
591. General Jackson Invades Spanish Territory and Takes Pensacola, HIST. ENGINE,
https://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/2329 (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
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agreed to cede the Floridas to the United States.592 Congress did not ratify the
Adam-Onis Treaty until 1821.593
In the interim, military officers immediately assumed the duties of civil
magistrates.594 The commission appointing the first governor, authorized
Jackson “to exercise . . . all the powers and authorities heretofore exercised by
the Governor and Captain General and by the Intendant of Cuba, and by the
Governors of East and West Florida, within the said provinces, respectively.”595
Jackson, accordingly, issued an order establishing county courts comprised of
five justices of the peace each.596 For civil cases, Spanish law applied (outside
of witness examination), while in criminal matters common law applied.597
Premised on an indictment by a grand jury issued in the name of the United
States, the criminal trials themselves were public and held before a petit jury.598
Five days after the first order establishing the court, the governor issued another
ordinance detailing the court’s rules of procedure and setting compensation rates
for judicial officers.599 The commissions for judges in West Florida were
subsequently issued by Secretary Adams.600
During the Civil War, myriad occupation courts similarly emerged as the
Union brought different regions under control.601 The authority to convene such
tribunals depended on rank—not on any particular appointment to the court.602
Many of these courts were so informal that essentially no records of their
proceedings are left.603 They exercised criminal and, at times, civil
jurisdiction.604 Without a Congressional declaration of war, or legislative
framing for the courts or the rules they executed, these tribunals arose solely at
the behest of the executive. Applied to civilians in specified areas, they tried

592. THOMAS, supra note 458, at 65–66.
593. Id. at 65; Markus G. Puder, The Adams-Onís Treaty’s Bicentennial and Its Enduring
Legacy for the American Doctrine of Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 27 J. S.
LEGAL HIST. 79, 79 (2019).
594. THOMAS, supra note 458, at 68.
595. Special Commission to Major General Andrew Jackson for Carrying into Effect the
Stipulations of the Treaty (Mar. 20, 1821), 4 AM. STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN REL. 752 (Walter
Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
596. 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 2551 (1822).
597. Id. at 2551–52.
598. Id. at 2552.
599. 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 2553–56 (1822).
600. See THOMAS, supra note 458, at 88.
601. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 839.
602. BUREAU OF MIL. JUST., WAR DEP’T, DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL OF THE ARMY 34 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1866),
https://www.loc.gov/law/mlr/Lieber_Collection-pdf/Digest-of-Opinions-JAGArmy.pdf
603. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 839–40 n.73 (citing and quoting Provisional Judiciary of
Louisiana, 13 AM. L. REG. 257, 259 (1865)).
604. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 841.
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violations of law as defined by the occupying powers—an approach consistent
with traditional laws of war.
In 1862, for instance, multiple such courts marked New Orleans and its
surrounds.605 Immediately following capture of the city, Union forces
established a provost marshal’s court.606 It initially focused on more traditional
matters related to courts-martial matters: servicemembers and the laws of war.607
Soon, however, its jurisdiction extended into the civilian realm to all criminal
matters and most civil causes.608 The military also revived former parish courts
in the region.609 Many of the judges had left prior to occupation, requiring Union
forces to install new jurists.610 Some civil courts, in addition, resumed operating
in November 1862, with jurisdiction limited to defendants in the parish of
Orleans.611
All of these were local courts. To address the absence of any federal entities,
President Abraham Lincoln further created the United States Provisional Court
for the State of Louisiana.612 His authority to do so grew directly from the state
of unrest that marked the region. He explained, “[t]he insurrection which has
for some time prevailed in several of the States of this Union, including
Louisiana, [has] temporarily subverted and swept away the civil institutions of
that State, including the judiciary and the judicial authorities of the Union.”613
This made it “indispensably necessary” to establish “some judicial tribunal . . .
capable of administering justice.”614 Lincoln’s Executive Order establishing the
court gave the judge sweeping authority
to hear, try, and determine, all causes, civil and criminal, including
causes in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly all such
powers and jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit Courts of
the United States, conforming his proceedings, so far as possible, to
the course of proceedings and practice which has been customary in
the courts of the United States and Louisiana; his judgment to be final
and conclusive.615

605. Id. at 841.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Bederman, supra note 8, at 841.
612. President Abraham Lincoln, Exec. Order Establishing a Provisional Court in Louisiana
(Oct. 20, 1862), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-establishingprovisional-court-louisiana.
613. Id. See also Burke v. Miltenberger, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519, 519 (1873) (quoting the
Executive Order).
614. Burke, 86 U.S. at 519.
615. Id. at 519–20.
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The language indicated that the court would address all matters, both state and
federal. Lincoln went on to empower the judge “to make and establish such
rules and regulations as may be necessary for the exercise of his jurisdiction”
and to empower him “to appoint a prosecuting attorney, marshal, and
clerk . . . .”616 Appointment was at the pleasure of the President and was limited
to military occupation of the city of New Orleans and the state.617 The court was
to serve in an appellate capacity for civil cases outside of the parish of Orleans.
Throughout this time, Louisiana courts continued to operate behind Confederate
lines. To remedy the conflict, the judge of the Provisional Court merely ordered
that all cases in confederate courts be brought before his court.618 Soon
thereafter, the military governor in the occupied region issued an order
constituting a new state Supreme Court.619
Similar courts have been created in other occupied areas, such as the
Philippine Islands, which the military ruled from the capture of Manila in 1898
until Congress created a statutory framing in 1902.620 Similar experiences mark
U.S. actions in Cuba and Puerto Rico.621 As the Supreme Court of Tennessee
observed in Rutledge v. Fogg, a case upholding the decisions of a military
occupation tribunal convened in Memphis, Tennessee by a Union general, the
right of a country to occupy and govern the territory of another while in military
possession of it flows from the fact of conquest and the laws of war.622
The most recent example of the establishment of Article II courts in the midst
of armed rebellion and violence in U.S. territory is the imposition of martial law
in Hawaii during World War II. The Organic Act for the territory empowered
the governor, “in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when
the public safety requires it,” to “suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial law until
communication can be had with the President . . . .”623 On December 7, 1941,
Joseph Poindexter, the civilian territorial governor, responded to the Pearl
Harbor bombings by suspending the writ of habeas corpus and relinquishing
control of the territory to the U.S. Army commanding general, Walter C.
Short.624 For nearly three years, the civilian government was suspended.625

616. Id. at 520.
617. Id.
618. Bederman, supra note 8, at 842–43.
619. Id. at 843.
620. See THOMAS, supra note 458, at 282–303; Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691,
695.
621. See WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 62–63 (3d
rev. ed. 1914).
622. Rutledge v. Fogg, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 554, 559–61 (Tenn. 1866).
623. Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141, 153.
624. HARRY N. SCHEIBER & JANE L. SCHEIBER, BAYONETS IN PARADISE: MARTIAL LAW IN
HAWAI’I DURING WORLD WAR II 2 (Univ. of Hawai’i Press 2016).
625. Id.
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Throughout that time, military courts operated.626 The Supreme Court later
determined that the provisions in the Organic Act that allowed for imposition of
military rule did not empower the armed forces to supplant all civilian laws when
civilian government could continue to function.627 “Courts and their procedural
safeguards,” the Court wrote, “are indispensable to our system of government.
They were set up by our founders to protect the liberties they valued.”628 As the
system embraced “the antithesis of total military rule,” the Court had no choice
but to reject summary criminal trials by military tribunals.629 The boundary
between military and civilian power had to be carefully maintained.630
C. War with Foreign Powers
War with foreign powers provides a third context for the introduction of
Article II, Section 1 tribunals. Occupation courts in this instance must comport
with the law of conquest, which (as a matter of international law) requires that
conquering powers, to the extent practicable, respect local custom and laws.
Accordingly, in anticipation of assimilating regions into the United States, the
executive has consistently upheld local custom in the operation of occupation
courts, modifying local rules and procedures to the extent necessary to comport
with U.S. constitutional norms.
The war between the United States and Mexico, declared in May 1846, for
instance, led to the establishment of Article II, Section 1 occupation courts in
New Mexico.631 These tribunals derived from the President’s commander-inchief authorities: Colonel (and later Brigadier-General) Stephen W. Kearny’s
orders, issued June 3, 1846, showed the creation of the courts as an aspect of the
military command and control process.632 While eventually Congress might act
to establish a civil territorial administration, in the interim, the military was to
create a government replete with judicial functions.633
The Kearny Code as implemented subsequently drew heavily from the
Organic Law provided for governing the Missouri Territory—reflecting the
preparation of the document by Colonel A.W. Doniphan, of the first regiment of
Missouri mounted volunteers.634 The judicial structure consisted of a superior
(appellate) court, constituted by three judges, and a number of lower (circuit)
626. Id.
627. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946).
628. Id. at 322.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. See Occupation of Mexican Territory, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 29–19 (2d Sess., 1846).
632. Id. at 5–7.
633. See id. at 6.
634. Assisted by Private Willard P. Hall, the final version looked strikingly similar to the copy
of the Missouri statutes that Private Hall, an attorney, carried with him. See Matthew E. Stanley,
Hall, Willard Preble, CIV. WAR ON THE W. BORDER, https://civilwaronthewesternborder.org/
encyclopedia/hall-willard-preble (last visited Jan. 7, 2021).
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courts.635 The latter had jurisdiction over all criminal cases not otherwise
provided by law, and “exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases that were
not cognizable before the prefects and alcaldes.”636 The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the validity of the system as it operated until the territorial legislature
explicitly adopted the orders and laws of the provisional government, as well as
the judicial decisions rendered by its courts.637
In June 1846, the President directed General Kearny to gain control in
California.638 He was to work in concert with U.S. naval forces in the Pacific to
conquer the territory.639 As in New Mexico, the President instructed him to
establish civil government, leaving much to his discretion in doing so, such as
“best to conciliate the inhabitants, and render them friendly to the United
States.”640 In reflection of Kearny’s new responsibilities, W.L. Marcy, Secretary
of War, conveyed a promotion in rank upon him, to that of brevet brigadier
general, as soon as he set forth for California.641
In 1847, Commodore James Biddle, the naval commander in Monterey,
created a court to rule on prize vessels captured on the high sea.642 With the
agreement of the military governor of California, and (later) explicit Presidential
authorization, Biddle named a navy chaplain as judge.643 For matters on land,
special tribunals were similarly constituted, such as a court formed in 1847 in
Sonoma to address criminal charges regarding the murder and kidnaping of
Native Americans.644 The following year, a similar court convened at
Monterey.645 Absent a court of appeal, the governor occasionally heard
appellants. How they were treated, though, varied by the governor in question:
Governor Richard Mason, who served as the fifth military governor of
California, generally refused to hear an appeal if the case had already come
before a jury, whereas General Bennett Riley, who commanded the Military
Department in Upper California and acted as Provincial Governor 1849–50, in
at least some cases ordered a stay in execution until a higher court could be
convened.646

635. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 178 (1857).
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 29–19, at 5.
639. Id. at 6.
640. Id.
641. Id. at 7.
642. Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 512 (1851). See also Fay v. Montgomery,
8 F. Cas. 1112, 1113 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 4709).
643. Jecker, 54 U.S. at 512.
644. THOMAS, supra note 458, at 231.
645. Id.
646. See H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 31–17, at 391, 681, 770 (1st Sess.,1850).

616

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:543

The creation of these courts was considered an integral part of the prosecution
of war.647 During President James K. Polk’s annual message to Congress, he
recognized the United States’ “undisputed occupation” of New Mexico and the
Californias, “all resistance on the part of Mexico having ceased within their
limits.”648 He argued for their assimilation into the United States and called on
Congress to establish territorial governments as quickly as practicable over
them.649 In the interim, the land was to be “governed by our military and naval
commanders under the general authority which is conferred upon a conqueror
by the laws of war.”650 During the subsequent debates in Congress, members
recognized the President’s plenary power to govern conquered territory, subject
only to international law: the Constitution did not apply to land outside the
United States.651
Article II, Section 1 occupation courts do not just mark North American
territory formerly held by France, Spain, or Mexico. In the aftermath of World
War II, for instance, three courts were created to conduct matters in Germany
and Japan. Under Law No. 2, the United States suspended the German courts in
the zone that it occupied, replacing them with Military Government Courts.652
The Military Government asserted the authority to dismiss or suspend any
German judge or court official, to disbar any notary or lawyer, to supervise and
observe all judicial proceedings, to access all court documents and records, to
review all decisions of trial and appellate courts, and to nullify, suspend, or
modify any determination rendered by the courts.653 The occupation courts were
constituted by summary courts (for penalties of up to one year’s imprisonment
and fines up to $1,000), intermediate courts (for penalties of up to ten years’
imprisonment and fines not exceeding $10,000), and general courts (for
penalties of any lawful sentence, including capital cases).654 Their jurisdiction
extended to all offenses committed by non-military personnel in the occupied

647. See James K. Polk, President, Third Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1847),
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-7-1847-third-annualmessage.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id.
651. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 23 (1844) (comments of Rep. Robert
Barnwell Rhett (South Carolina) and Rep. James Alexander Seddon (Virginia)).
652. Germany Supreme Commander’s Area of Control Law No. 2, German Courts, arts. I–II,
MIL. GOV’T GAZETTE, GER., U.S. ZONE, no. A, June 1, 1946, 7–8
https://portal.dnb.de/bookviewer/view/1026623324#page/7/mode/1up;
Germany’s
Supreme
Commander’s Area of Control Proclamation No. 1, art. II, at 1.
653. Law No. 2, art. VII, at 9–10.
654. Eli E. Nobleman, Military Government Courts in Germany, 267 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 88. For further discussion of the Military Government Court, see Eli E.
Nobleman, Note, American Military Government Courts in Germany, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 803
(1946).
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area, trying matters linked to both German law and legislation passed by the
military government.655
The Rules of Practice for Military Government Courts reflected AngloAmerican, German, and courts-martial practices. All persons arrested were to
be brought as soon as practicable before a tribunal and apprised of the charges.656
During trial, defendants could cross-examine witnesses and present their case.657
Certain fundamental rights, mirroring those laid out in the U.S. constitution,
would be afforded to defendants.658 The courts had exclusive criminal
jurisdiction.659
The U.S. also created a Military Government Court for Civil Actions,
consisting of three members of the bar in good standing in one of the states or
territories or the District of Columbia of the United States.660 In 1949, the United
States Courts of the Allied High commission, operated by the U.S. State
Department, replaced the Military Government tribunals with civilian jurists.661
In addition to criminal matters, the court addressed all cases in which
servicemembers or their dependents, or civilian officials, were a party.662 These
tribunals ended with the transfer of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany).663 However, the United States maintained an
occupation regime within West Berlin.664 Thus, the United States Court for
Berlin was established in 1955.665 By the time it was abolished in 1990,
however, it had only heard one case.666
The Treaty of Peace with Japan authorized the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over certain Japanese territories.667 In 1957, President Eisenhower
issued an Executive Order providing for a judicial system in the Ryukyu Islands
modeled after that employed in Puerto Rico.668 It provided for a local court with
655. Military Government Courts in Germany, supra note 654, at 88.
656. Rules of Practice in Military Government Courts, Extract, Rule 6(1), MIL. GOV’T
GAZETTE, GER., U.S. ZONE, no. A, June 1, 1946, at 63, 64.
657. Rule 10(1), id. at 65–66.
658. See id. at 63–71.
659. Bederman, supra note 8, at 846.
660. Ordinance No. 6, Military Government Court for Civil Actions, MIL. GOV’T GAZETTE,
GER., U.S. ZONE, no. A, June 1, 1946, at 73.
661. Bederman, supra note 8, at 846.
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. See id.
665. U.S. High Comm’r for Ger. Law No. 46, Apr. 28, 1955, reprinted in Unite States v. Tiede,
86 F.R.D. 227, 261–65 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
666. United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 237 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (noting that the court
was “established pursuant to powers granted to the President by Article II of the Constitution”); see
also Bederman, supra note 8, at 846–47.
667. Treaty of Peace with Japan (Treaty of San Francisco), art. 3, Apr. 28, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 3169,
3172–73.
668. Exec. Order No. 10,713, § 10, 3 C.F.R. 68, 369–371 (Supp. 1957).
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general jurisdiction over civil matters and criminal jurisdiction related to
Ryukyuans, as well as a second, Civil Administration Court system, with trial
and appellate tribunals.669 These entities had authority over any case or
controversy impacting U.S. property or interests, as well as cases to which U.S.
persons were party.670 The U.S. relinquished control of the Ryukyu Islands in
1972.671
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
Administrative agencies house several adjudicatory bodies that are not
considered part of the federal judicial system. They are distinguished by the
degree of independence that they have from even the Executive. Their existence
derives in significant measure from the Progressive Era and the rapid
proliferation of the administrative state.672 It would be impossible to summarize
all such entities: as of March 2017, more than 1,900 administrative law judges
(ALJs) were serving in at least 27 adjudicatory bodies, with their specific roles
and responsibilities reflecting those of the agencies and departments in which
they were located.673
The largest of these entities, which rivals the size of the Bankruptcy Courts,
is the Social Security Administration (SSA), which houses nearly eighty-five
percent of all ALJs.674 The SSA annually processes over 650,000 decisions at
the hearing level.675 Like the SSA, most administrative agency tribunals hold
hearings, issue decisions or make recommendations, and enforce agency
regulations.676 Many of these decisions are reviewable within an appellate
structure within the agency, such as the SSA’s Appeals Council. Often, the
reviewing body consists of administrative appeals judges (AAJs).677

669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu
Islands and Daito Islands, Japan–U.S., June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 447 (entered into force May 15,
1972).
672. Executive Agency Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/executiveagency-courts (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
673. See ALJs by Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/
administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
674. ALJs by Agency, supra note 673 (indicating that 1,655 of the 1,931 ALJs are attached to
the Social Security Administration).
675. Information About SSA’s Hearings and Appeals Operations, SSA.gov,
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_us.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2021). The only Article I or III
judicial body that sees more cases per year are the Bankruptcy Courts. Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseloadstatistics-2019#:~:text=Civil%20Filings,rose%202%20percent%20to%20150%2C936 (last visited
Jan. 8, 2021) (795,926 terminated cases).
676. Executive Agency Courts, supra note 672.
677. 5 U.S.C. § 5372b.
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Similarly, by statute, the U.S. Tax court “is not an agency of, and shall be
independent of, the executive branch.”678 The line between the quasi-judicial
functions often undertaken by administrative agencies and the judicial matters
that come before Article I or Article III courts, though, is not always clear. In
1932, for example, the Court allowed a private right (workers’ compensation) to
be heard by an agency, while still trying to preserve Article III courts’ role in
determining questions of law, as well as certain matters of fact.679 This case
played a central role in the growth of the administrative agencies.680
Entities discussed in Part III, above (i.e., specialized Article I, Section 8
courts), are (a) statutorily named a court of record; (b) explicitly established
under Article I by statute; or (c) stated by the Supreme Court or by the reviewing
appellate court as being an Article I court. In contrast, administrative tribunals
do not fit any of these categories.681 Some are themselves recognized as
independent agencies within a department, with the power to rule on decisions
issued by other agencies.
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, for instance,
created in 1970, rules on cases forwarded by the Department of Labor which
relate to disputes over the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s
safety and health inspections.682 The Executive Office for Immigration Review
at the U.S. Department of Justice administers the immigration court system.
Once the Department of Homeland Security charges an alien with violating
immigration laws, EOIR determines whether the person is removable and/or
whether they qualify for relief.683 EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration Judge
has some 350 immigration judges who hold removal hearings as well as other
administrative proceedings in 60 immigration courts across the country.684 The
appellate entity, the Board of Immigration Appeals, hears appeals from certain
DHS determinations and immigration judge decisions, most of which involve
orders of removal or applications for relief. Certain orders are designated as
678. 26 U.S.C. § 7441.
679. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 37, 49–51, 63–65 (1932). See also Pfander, supra note
9, at 658–59.
680. Id. at 659 (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 367–377 (5th ed. 2003); Fallon, Jr., supra note 9, at 946–48,
986–91).
681. The U.S. Immigration Courts, for instance, are firmly entrenched inside the Department
of Justice and not independent. There are no cases from the Supreme Court or Courts of Appeals
stating that they are Article I courts; nor does the legislation creating them indicate such. In
addition, there are several law review articles indicating they are not Article I courts. See, e.g.,
Leonard Birdsong, Reforming the Immigration Courts of the United States: Why Is There No Will
to Make It an Article I Court?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 17 (2013).
682. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678).
683. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FACT SHEET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW: AN AGENCY GUIDE 1 (Dec. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_
an_agency_guide/download.
684. Id.
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precedential, governing similarly-situated cases going forward.685 The EOIR
also includes an Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, which
oversees cases involving sanctions on employers for hiring unauthorized
workers.686 The Administrative Procedure Act sets the rules that govern
administrative agencies, with subsequent review of their decisions in Article III
courts.687
CONCLUSION
For decades, scholars have wrestled with how Article I courts, in the absence
of life tenure during good behavior, undiminished compensation, and
appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate, could as a constitutional
matter hear categories of cases and controversies reserved to Article III. A
handful have endorsed the theory of appellate review: as long as cases can be
adequately examined by an Article III court, Congress has some leeway in the
tribunals it erects.688 Others considered the operation of Article I entities to be
merely necessary.689
In 2004, Professor James Pfander offered instead a distinction rooted in the
constitutional text: between the inferior courts referenced in Article III and the
inferior tribunals of Article I, distinguishing them by, in the case of the former,
the exercise of the judicial power of the United States.690 He noted, as a
condition for the latter, their subservience to Article III. Pfander’s account is
helpful for elucidating matters related to Separation of Powers; however, it
leaves open the question of how to think about courts that are neither Article I
entities nor subservient to the Supreme Court, such as territorial, consular, or
occupation courts. In his narrow emphasis on the Article III/Article I divide,
moreover, Pfander did not consider the possibility that either Article IV or
Article II might provide an alternative constitutional locus. Of these, territorial
courts have come in for their fair share of criticism.691 Perhaps most recently,
Professor William Baud has attempted to bridge the difference between federal
adjudicatory bodies by suggesting a distinction based on the specific power
being exercised: i.e., when courts exercise an executive power, they are an
Article I entity, whereas when they exercise a judicial power, they must be

685. Id.
686. Id.
687. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
688. See, e.g., Fallon, Jr., supra note 9, at 943–49; Redish, supra note 9, at 226–28.
689. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 9, at 265.
690. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004).
691. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 9, at 719 (calling the Supreme Court’s acceptance of
territorial courts in Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), as
“the first small step down the road to perdition”); Lawson, supra note 9, at 892 (referring to
Marshall’s decision in Canter as “fatuous”).
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understood as the judicial power of the sovereign in question.692 Accordingly,
states, tribal entities, and the federal government, as well as territories, constitute
separate governments, for which a judicial power can be exercised in parallel
with each other.
In some ways, Baud’s approach gets us further than Pfander, in that it accounts
for territorial entities. But it still does not address the existence of other federal
tribunals, such as consular courts, slave courts, extraterritorial entities, or courts
of occupation. When all federal courts are taken into account, a very different
picture emerges—one rooted in the Constitutional text. As this Article has
demonstrated, the federal judicial system, is comprised of general and
specialized Article III, Section 1 courts that carry the judicial power of the
United States and, as such, constitute the third branch. It includes specialized
courts introduced by Congress consistent with Article I, Sections 8 and 9 and
other enumerated powers, and territorial courts derived from Article IV, Section
3. In addition, it is constituted by treaty-based extraterritorial courts rooted in
both Article II, Section 2 and Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 and courts of
occupation introduced by the President consistent with the Article II, Section 2
Commander-in-Chief authority. All of these tribunals have a constitutional
nexus. Many—but not all—of them are established by Congress. Many—but
not all—of them are inferior to the Supreme Court. Some—but not all of them—
exercise the judicial power of the United States. All of them adjudicate matters
of law in ways that impact the rights of U.S. citizens. It is time to jettison the
prior models and adopt, instead, a more robust understanding of the federal
judicial system, grounded in the Constitutional text.

692. See Baude, supra note 8.
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